After Chinese and U.S. presidents met in Beijing in May, the phrase "a constructive relationship of strategic stability" quickly emerged as a key framework for the future of bilateral relations: Cooperation should remain the main theme, competition should stay within limits, differences should be managed and peace should remain within reach.

It is not merely diplomatic language. It reflects an effort to move the world's most consequential bilateral relationship away from confrontation and toward a more predictable, constructive and sustainable framework.

However, the U.S. has attached its own condition, saying that such a relationship should be built "on the basis of fairness and reciprocity." At first glance, these words may sound reasonable. But in the current U.S. policy context, they also carry a very specific meaning, and risk turning a broad strategic framework into a narrow transactional mechanism.

In U.S. discourse, "fairness" has long been used to accuse China of creating so-called unfair competition through industrial policies, state-owned enterprises, subsidies, technology practices and trade surpluses. "Reciprocity," especially in the trade vocabulary of Donald Trump, often means mirror-image retaliation—matching other countries' tariffs and market access measures—rather than mutual benefit. It suggests that the U.S. sets the standard, identifies the gap and then asks China to adjust.

In major-power relations, words are never neutral. Whoever defines the concept often shapes the agenda. Whoever explains "stability" may also define the boundaries of competition. For this reason, the meaning of "constructive strategic stability" should not be unilaterally revised by Washington.

Beyond transactional logic

The main value of the new consensus lies in preventing China and the U.S. from sliding into conflict. More importantly, it offers a framework for long-term coexistence. It should cover political security, the Taiwan question, military-to-military communication, economic and technological relations, people-to-people exchange and cooperation on global issues.

Yet the U.S. Government's emphasis on "fairness and reciprocity" appears to place the idea back inside a familiar American policy logic: China must first respond to U.S. concerns on trade deficits, market access, supply chains and industrial competition before stability can be sustained.

It also serves U.S. domestic politics. By presenting engagement with China as a way to secure gains for American workers, farmers and industries, Washington can describe dialogue not as mutual respect, but as a victory in which it has "won back" benefits from China.

That anxiety precisely explains why Washington insists on defining "fairness and reciprocity" on its own terms: Controlling the narrative allows the U.S. to preserve its policy tools for slowing, containing, or conditioning China's rise. Yet fully accepting the Chinese interpretation would compel Washington to accept limits on the securitization of competition, refrain from suppressing China's development, and exercise restraint on Taiwan, technology and alliances, all of which run counter to current U.S. policies. A selectively embraced version may sustain a minimum common language in the short term, but over time, it risks breeding new misunderstandings.

Risks of redefinition

For China, constructive strategic stability is a long-term framework for guiding the overall direction of bilateral relations. For the U.S., it may become a platform for bargaining, risk management and issue-by-issue transactions. This difference could easily produce misplaced expectations.

First, stability could be overly commercialized. Strategic stability should not be limited to measurable trade results such as aircraft purchases, agricultural exports, market access or mineral supply chains. If the U.S. treats the framework mainly as a way to secure Chinese responses to U.S. economic demands, bilateral ties fall back into an imbalanced pattern of U.S. requests, Chinese compliance and cyclical pressure.

Second, if the U.S. treats strategic stability primarily as a transactional platform for trade and economic gains, it may be tempted to treat the Taiwan question as a separate, compartmentalized issue—one that can be managed or even exploited without affecting the overall stability narrative. That would be a dangerous fallacy. Taiwan is at the core of China's core interests and remains the most sensitive issue at the very heart of China-U.S. relations. If the U.S. discusses stability in trade while continuing to undertake high-risk actions on Taiwan, the overall relationship will become unstable at its roots.

Third, the U.S. may continue to expand the concept of national security. Washington has already placed many areas of normal economic and technological activity under security review, including semiconductors, AI, quantum technologies and other dual-use sectors. If "fairness and reciprocity" are defined only by the U.S., the result may be asymmetric: The U.S. keeps its security exceptions, while China is expected to maintain openness and supply-chain stability. That is not reciprocity; it is selective advantage—only for the U.S.

Fourth, cooperation on global issues could be weakened. China and the U.S. have room to coordinate on issues such as regional crises, nuclear risks, climate change, public health and global economic stability. But this joint effort must be based on equality. If the U.S. sees China's role only as support for its strategic priorities, cooperation may become another source of pressure rather than a path toward shared responsibility.

Finally, public confidence in stable relations could suffer. When a strategic framework is reduced to a ledger of U.S. gains versus Chinese concessions, both societies begin to perceive the relationship through a zero-sum lens, with each side believing the other is taking advantage. China has repeatedly emphasized that the hope of China-U.S. relations lies in the people, its foundation is in society, its future is in the youth, and its vitality is in local exchanges. If the new framework is reduced to transactions, Americans may only hear what the U.S. "got" from China, while Chinese people may see "stability" as another name for U.S. pressure. In both societies, support for long-term coexistence of the two countries would weaken.

Defining stability together 

China does not need to reject the words "fairness" and "reciprocity." The real question is who defines them and how they are practiced.

Fairness should mean fairness under rules based on mutual respect. It should include respect for each country's social system, development path and legitimate right to development. It should also entail respect for international rules, not the extraterritorial application of one country's domestic law. The U.S. cannot restrict Chinese technology companies in the name of national security while demanding full benefits for U.S. companies in China. Nor can it criticize China's industrial policy while heavily subsidizing its own manufacturing sector.

Reciprocity, in turn, should signify two-way responsibility, not one-way concession. If China expands purchases, improves market access or helps stabilize supply chains, the U.S. should also reduce tariffs, ease sanctions, improve visa policies, create a fair environment for Chinese companies and stop discriminatory enforcement. If Washington expects China to play a constructive role on global issues, it should also respect China's positions and diplomatic contributions.

The Taiwan question must be placed at the center of any discussion of strategic stability. Upholding the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiqués is the political foundation of bilateral relationship. U.S. actions such as arms sales to Taiwan, official contacts, military training, Taiwan-related legislation and efforts to expand Taiwan's international space should be treated as real risks to stability. The U.S. cannot speak of fairness and reciprocity in trade while reserving freedom to undermine stability on China's core interests.

China should also work to make the new framework more institutionalized and verifiable. This could include a cooperation list covering trade, agriculture, counternarcotics, climate, public health and people-to-people exchange; a differences list covering tariffs, technology controls, investment reviews, visas, media and law enforcement; a risk list covering Taiwan, the South China Sea, cyber issues, military encounters and third-party crises; and a red-line list clarifying actions that would fundamentally damage strategic stability.

These mechanisms would help prevent selective interpretation and turn a shared phrase into shared practice.

Wang Peng is a research fellow at the School of Marxism, Huazhong University of Science and Technology. Long Yushuai is a Ph.D. candidate at the School of Marxism, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Copyedited by G.P. Wilson

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