Japan tried to add military aid to the ODA program as early as in April 2012, when then Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko offered patrol ships to the Philippines amid its row with China over China's Huangyan Island. Yoshihiko proposed to provide the Philippines loans to buy the patrol ship in the form of a special use of the ODA to support the Philippines and abet the conflict. However, the plan was put on hold with the resignation of Yoshihiko's cabinet at the end of 2012.

Abe then upheld his predecessor's proposal after winning the parliamentary election and assuming office in 2012. The Philippines lacked the funds to pay for the patrol ships, but Abe insisted on providing them free of charge. Whether in the form of a loan or a donation, the patrol ship stood as a kind of ODA-based military aid.

Besides the Philippines, the Abe administration has planned to market Japan-made patrol ships to other countries that have disputes with China in the South China Sea, such as Viet Nam.

Moreover, providing the Philippines with a patrol ship will inevitably stir up tensions in the South China Sea. The risky move casts doubt on the Abe administration's promise to avoid the use of ODA aid to abet international conflicts.

Thinly veiled

The revision of the ODA Charter is more than just a bid to support certain countries. Instead, it reveals Japan's deeper strategic considerations.

Following several decades of economic growth, China's national strength has become superior to that of Japan in many aspects. Japan may be resistant to the idea of China playing a leading role in the East Asian region. With the goal of restoring the right to adopt military means to address disputes, Abe is pushing an amendment to the nation's pacifist constitution.

The official relationship between China and Japan was frozen following the latter's announcement of a "national purchase" of the Diaoyu Islands in September 2012. Japan, in the face of China's claims of sovereignty over the islands, has accelerated its military presence and sought to loosen constitutional restrictions amid the regional competition with China.

Abe spares no efforts in building a coalition to contain the growing influence of China. To some extent, the South China Sea issue will become more complicated if Japan provides military aid in the form of ODA to countries in the region that have territorial disputes with China. Last year, Japan unveiled plans to provide the Philippines and Viet Nam with patrol ships in order to boost the two nations' maritime forces. Japan hopes to capitalize on the geopolitical situation, but it cannot guarantee that its aid recipient countries would not use the money for combat operations.

Recently, two Japanese citizens were executed by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham militants in retaliation for Abe's pledge of $200 million in aid to fight against terrorism and extremism during his latest visit to the Middle East. The prime minister stressed his determination to eradicate terrorism and strengthen Japan's cooperation with the international community on this matter. He will also use the opportunity to promote the constitutional amendment enlarging the overseas activities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. In the aftermath of the hostage crisis, the new charter was revised to allow for the use of funds in counterterrorism operations.

In addition to counterterrorism, the charter includes a broad range of military aid without including specific limits. Japan may use this new flexibility to become gradually more entangled in international military conflicts, potentially violating Japan's long-term pacifist foreign policy.

If so, Japan's peaceful national policy that has lasted for nearly 70 years will face an end. Abe and his right-wing supporters are seeking the right to choose military means in resolving disputes, but have failed to give a clear answer as to the conditions and the degree with which it would use such force. Without firm boundaries, Japan's military growth will inevitably raise concerns in East Asia.

The author is a professor at the Institute of International Relations under the China Foreign Affairs University

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