Bilateral complexities

USEFUL FIREARMS: A Chinese soldier introduces a weapon to Indian soldiers in Belgaum, India, on December 6, 2008 during a joint antiterror drill In some circumstances, it is more than fair to say "Chindia" does not mean "China and India"—but rather "China versus India" (LI GANG)

Beyond that, bilateral relations between China and India are even more complex. This is mainly due to the long-running issues regarding territorial integrity.

Still, both countries have committed themselves to bolstering economic and trade ties as well as non-governmental exchanges, so as to eliminate—or at least minimize—differences over historical, territorial and political problems.

Undeniably, these efforts have borne fruit. But whether this economic cooperation will lead to better political relations remains an open question.

At this point, border disputes and the Tibet issue are two biggest sticking points in the way of Sino-Indian bilateral relations.

Beijing and New Delhi have agreed on the benefits of their bilateral relations for themselves—as well as for the region and the world beyond. But the true quandary is to what extent these powers are willing to make concessions on contested territory to improve overall relations.

Thus far, some positive progress has been made on the border issue—demonstrating goodwill on both sides. Nonetheless, this is not enough. Since 2003, special representatives of both countries have held 13 rounds of talks. But so far, their biggest achievement has been merely to begin exploring a framework for a resolution.

What they need, however, is a carefully constructed agreement which will negate political risks on both sides while allowing for the flowering of economic and other types of relations.

The Tibet issue has long been the main thorn in the history of Sino-Indian relations. For one thing, India has recognized Tibet as belonging to China. This has been strengthened with an official declaration in 2003—one saying that "Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."

At the same time, however, it has permitted the Dalai Lama, an ethnic separatist seeking "Tibet independence," and his movement to reside in India for more than half a century.

In explaining its contradictory stance, New Delhi labeled it "a historical problem." The Chinese Government is, of course, unsatisfied with this explanation.

In addition, further factors precluding a more solid basis for Sino-Indian relations include respective efforts at military modernization, trade disputes and nationalist sentiments in both countries.

There is, however, one positive factor that stands above the rest—increasingly close economic and trade relations.

Several years ago, Ziad Haider from the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, said that the strengthening of economic relations would invariably lead to peace and lessen the likelihood of confrontation.

But, under some circumstances, India might also deem it worthwhile to sacrifice economic ties with China and ally itself with the United States.

Fortunately for China, India differs from the United States when it comes to the contentious issue of the renminbi's exchange rate against the dollar.

This offers strong evidence that conflicts between India and China are not seriously driven by the United States—or other external factors or powers—but instead by India's own interests.

To achieve the goal of more harmonious relations on the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Indian relations, practical measures and—above all—compromises are needed.

The author is a research fellow with the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences