From the beginning, many Canadians were puzzled by the Conservatives' hard line on China. The Liberals, naturally, were critical. Chrétien, now retired, referred to Harper's policy as "immature," claiming that Canada and China could have constructive discussions on human rights and other irritants despite their different political systems: "I met 18 times with the president of China," Chrétien said at the 2006 Liberal leadership convention. "I discussed human rights every time…Engage them, don't insult them."

Criticism also came from former diplomats, academics, foreign policy commentators and, most significantly, elements of the business community, a powerful element in the Conservative coalition. Harper and his ministers, though, remained unmoved through most of 2008. For example, Harper did not attend the Beijing Olympics. He said he was not boycotting the event, just that he had other commitments, but his absence was noted, especially considering most other major world leaders, including the U.S. president, attended.

A change in attitude did not become apparent until after the international financial crisis exploded in September 2008. With Canada's major trading partner, the United States, seemingly on the brink of an economic catastrophe, the criticism Harper had put too many Canadian eggs in the U.S. basket gained new credibility. But Harper's government had also changed in subtle ways. Let's look back at those three motivating factors: ideology, geopolitics and partisan politics.

By the time the effects of the economic crisis hit Canada, the Conservatives had been in power for more than two and a half years. In that time, they learned ideology alone could not provide all the answers to complex political and economic problems—compromise was necessary to adapt to new situations. Harper had already backed away from his previously open-ended commitment to Canada's military role in Afghanistan. Facing rising casualties, no apparent military or political progress and growing opposition from the electorate, Harper and the Liberal opposition agreed to end Canada's military mission in 2011.

A similar change occurred in economic policy. Even after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Bush administration's emergency efforts to arrest the spread of the financial crisis by buying up troubled assets, Harper and his finance minister refused to contemplate an economic stimulus package and the deficit spending it would require. The government's economic statement in November 2008, in fact, still predicted a slight budget surplus. This was so outrageous, so out of tune with what other major industrialized countries were doing, the opposition threatened to unite and defeat the Conservatives in parliament at their first opportunity. Harper survived the immediate parliamentary crisis but quickly changed his economic policy. He suddenly became a convert to Keynesian economics, embracing economic stimulus and deficit spending, and has spent the past year showering money around Canada. As on the Afghanistan issue, pragmatism and political calculation trumped ideology.

On geopolitics, Canada remains a firm U.S. ally, but Harper has discovered being overly dependent on the United States carries political and, especially, economic risks. We've already discussed Afghanistan and Canada's intention to end its combat role just as the United States is escalating its involvement in the conflict. On the economic front, Canada's heavy reliance on the U.S. market has left the Canadian economy vulnerable to the sharp reduction in U.S. consumer demand as well as growing trade protectionism since the onset of the recession. Canadian firms have found themselves shut out from lucrative contracts in the public sector due to "Buy America" provisions in the stimulus legislation passed by the U.S. Congress. Onerous U.S. security requirements also have hurt Canadian exporters. Trade diversification, an old Liberal policy, is now much more attractive.

Finally, in the realm of partisan politics, the Liberal Party has been in a state of crisis for the better part of two years. Paul Martin resigned after his defeat in the 2006 election but his successor, Stéphane Dion, fared even worse in the October 2008 election and was quickly deposed. The current leader, Michael Ignatieff, is also floundering—polls indicate Harper could win a majority if an election were held today.

Combined, these factors have removed the domestic political barriers to a Canadian rapprochement with China. The exigencies of the economic crisis, the ongoing weakness and vulnerability of the U.S. economy and China's strong growth have overridden the Harper Conservatives' ideological and geopolitical preferences. Canada needs to diversify its economic partners and China, along with other emerging economies like India and Brazil, offers attractive prospects. Meanwhile, the Liberal Party is so weak and so unlikely to pose a significant threat in the next election that the old perception of China as a Liberal priority has become irrelevant. Harper now can forge his own relationship with Beijing.

Such a move has the approval of the Canadian political class. For months, even years, media commentators have been calling on the Conservatives to put aside their ideological hang-ups and move decisively on the China front. Harper's upcoming visit, and U.S. President Barack Obama's recently concluded China trip, have been the occasions for long articles in Canadian media proclaiming the "rise of China" or the "Asian century," as well as anxiety about the relative decline of the United States in the emerging multipolar world system.

Jeffrey Simpson, the national affairs columnist of the Globe and Mail—probably the most influential journalist in Canada—has returned to these themes several times over the past couple of years, writing: "What has happened, and what will happen, in China is the most consequential story in the world," and "the post-Cold War dominance of the United States is fading perceptibly, with longer-term consequences for any country (read Canada) tied so tightly to its star."

Like other critics of Harper's ideological rigidity and obsession with political gamesmanship, Simpson bemoans the fact it has taken so long for Canada's Conservatives to recognize the new global reality. Yet despite the wait, the stage is set at last for a new era in Sino-Canadian relations. The question now is whether Harper and Canadian entrepreneurs possess the skill and creativity to take advantage of this moment to turn goodwill into concrete results.

The author is an editor at the Toronto Star and a former member of the editorial staff of Beijing Review

(The viewpoints in this article do not necessarily represent those of Beijing Review)