The armistice agreement was badly shaken in the wake of these moves, but it was maintained as the Cold War came to an end and as the countries concerned had long bid farewell to their wartime relations.

Since the North Korean nuclear crisis broke out, and especially since North Korea carried out an underground nuclear test last October 9, there have been major challenges to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. How to establish a new accord to safeguard peace on the peninsula has been thrust into the spotlight.

Complex concerns

Against this backdrop, a peace accord is both necessary and inevitable. In particular, the United States, a longtime opponent of the peace agreement, recently has changed its attitude, making it possible to shape a new peace regime.

The change, of course, was prompted by the fresh progress made in peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. At the same time, it should be noted that the Bush administration tends to adopt an opportunistic policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue in light of political needs at home. In addition, the parties concerned have varying perspectives on the peace agreement. So, it will be difficult to launch negotiations before major controversies are addressed.

First and foremost, the signatories to the peace agreement should be agreed upon. Some people believe that the accord should be a bilateral agreement between North Korea and the United States, because they are the main parties involved in this issue. Others maintain that the North Korea and United States should sign the accord with the countersignatures of China and South Korea, countries that also took part in the Korean War. Some argue that because the armistice agreement was signed by North Korea, China and the United States on behalf of the United Nations, the peace agreement also should be signed by the three parties. Some others hold that all the countries involved in the six-party talks-North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and Japan-should all sign it.

Because the peace treaty is designed to replace the armistice agreement, it would be improper to exclude China from the signatories from a legal point of view. Also, China has major security interests on the Korean Peninsula. The Sino-Korean Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in 1961 contains provisions on a military alliance between China and North Korea. If China keeps itself out of the peace agreement and doesn't exert its influence over the peace accord on the Korean Peninsula, it might be dragged into a war.

Likewise, the proposal that the agreement should be signed by North Korea and the United States with the countersignatures of China and South Korea is not legally valid. If we want a strict substitute for the armistice agreement, the document should be signed by North Korea, China and the United States. However, given the fact that South Korea participated in the war, a document signed by the four parties is most desirable. Such an agreement would be more effective and could compensate for the erroneous decision made by the then South Korean Government not to sign the armistice agreement.

Of course, it would be best if the six parties could ink a peace agreement or a similar international treaty, which would be tantamount to a collective East Asian security framework.

To sum up, the peace agreement's goal is to shape lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. It should be a strategic arrangement. No party should take advantage of it to pursue short-term diplomatic gains.

The relationship between the peace agreement and the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue is another point of contention. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons has caused uncertainties for East Asian peace and stability. At present, all parties concerned, including North Korea, are calling for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Because safeguarding lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia is the purpose of the peace accord, it should be based on North Korea's abandonment of its nuclear weapons. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons not only threatens peace and stability in East Asia, but also challenges the universally recognized principle of non-proliferation.

After North Korea conducted its underground nuclear test last October, many formerly positive moves began to take on negative implications. Take, for instance, some countries' efforts to develop economic and trade relations with North Korea. These efforts were positive before the nuclear test; but afterward, they became a de-facto encouragement to a nuclear-capable North Korea.

Also, South Korea's provision of food, fertilizers, power and funds to North Korea to ease tensions between the two sides was deemed as conducive to national reconciliation before the test. But after the nuclear test, such support indirectly could fuel North Korea's nuclear programs.

In the same vein, if the parties sign a peace agreement before North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons, it would perpetuate a nuclear-armed Korean Peninsula, something that runs counter to the purposes of all the countries concerned.

Given the many complexities of the situation, the peace treaty will not take shape any time soon. The parties involved are expected to negotiate the treaty as North Korea scraps its nuclear weapons. They should move neither too quickly nor too slowly so that the peace treaty can be signed on the day when North Korea completes its denuclearization. This is the only approach that conforms to the principle of abandoning nuclear weapons for peace.

The author is a professor at the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China