The U.S. MD system is made up of a pre-warning satellite, pre-warning radar, ground-based radar, a ground-based intercepting missile and battle management, a command, control and communications (BM/C3) system, in which the ground-based intercepting missile is the core of the whole system. From the angle of actual combat, the system can intercept missiles in three different courses, initial, mid and terminal, so as to protect U.S. troops in front lines, as well as allies and other important countries and regions where America has big interests.

Of late, America’s cooperativeness with its European allies on MD has yielded rich fruit. The European MD system, especially, established under the NATO framework, will be effective in protecting America’s European allies from missile attacks. However, the United States believes that its anti-missile system in Europe covers too limited an area to guarantee the safety of all NATO members. Thus it must set up new anti-missile bases in Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic and Poland, to fend off missile threats from countries such as Iran. America’s plan is obvious: in the name of expanding coverage of its anti-missile system, it aims to realize its own anti-Russia strategy, and this has been proved by the U.S. rejection of Russia’s suggestion of establishing a base in Azerbaijan.

Different strokes

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s suggestion was borne of thoughtful strategic consideration. First of all, his suggestion brought Russia more diplomatic sympathy from the world, and blew away America’s chance of stressing its stance on the anti-missile base, during the recent G8 summit. According to Russia, if the two countries could jointly use the radar base in Azerbaijan, the anti-missile coverage scope would include the whole of Europe. Plus, since Azerbaijan is a neighbor of Iran, Russia believes that a radar base in this country not only fits into U.S. plans to build an MD system in Eastern Europe to cope with threats from Iran, but also saves Russia the trouble of placing an offensive weapon system along European borders.

Second, at the military technical level, Putin pointed out that the Gabala missile pre-warning radar station in Azerbaijan used to be a Soviet Union military information base, and is now a Russia-rented radar station, according to an agreement signed by Russia and Azerbaijan. The radar base can monitor a range of about 6,000 square km, and serve as a pre-warning against sea-based ballistic missiles and ground-based missiles with nuclear warheads. Azerbaijan shares a border with Iran that is over 400 km long; the Gabala radar base is 150 km from the Iran borderline, and about 600 km from the Russia borderline. Putin’s suggestion means that Russia itself can use the radar base, and cannot be monitored. On the contrary, the U.S. chosen spots in Poland and the Czech Republic are at a distance of 3,000 km to Iran, but the one in the Czech Republic is only 1,000 km from Russia. Therefore, Russia’s suggestion should have been rational and acceptable to America. Russia also proposed that in the first phase the two powers could share the radar base in Azerbaijan, and the anti-missile defense system could be set up after some country tested long-range missiles. It takes at least three to five years to officially launch a long-range missile after it has been tested, and during that period of time, any kind of anti-missile defense installment can be established.

But this is not in accordance with U.S. strategy. What America cares is not the range of the radar base, but how to deter Russia. The planned missile intercepting station and pre-warning radar station cover an area as big as 100 square km, and will be fully U.S.-controlled bases. As a result, America can realize its goal of striking Russia strategically. The interception of ballistic missiles is carried out in three different phases during the missile’s flight, and the flying missile is easily destroyed during its initial course of booster phase, which means that the anti-missile system should be close to the targeted missile base. Therefore, Poland and the Czech Republic would be a better choice for the U.S. underhand strategy. Another goal of the United States is to further control Europe, by which the United States can stabilize its base in “New Europe” and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.

New round of military equipment competition

Today the fragile ties between Russia and the United States are on the verge of deteriorating, owing to the anti-missile issue and the U.S. insistence that it deploys anti-missile bases in Russia’s neighborhood. U.S.-Russia relations have reached a crucial period, and the wisdom of the top leaders in the two countries will decide the future of their relationship. America will not regard Russia as its democratic ally; Russia’s ties with the United States will never be as close as those with Germany, India or China. U.S. action continues to greatly decrease Russia’s sense of security, as a result of which Russia will definitely enlarge its national defense investment. Because the U.S. behavior is going to damage the balance of world military power, a new round of military equipment competition is likely to be brought up.

The relationship between the United State and Russia now drops to the lowest point since the end of the Cold War.

The author is an academician with the Academy of Military Sciences, People’s Liberation Army