Crucial talks

The six-party talks, initiated and hosted by China, have become the most important platform for China to pursue its DPRK policy. It is already an astonishing feat that the six-party talks have managed to bring the opposing parties together for serious discussions, providing an influence on the Northeast Asian situation since they started 10 years ago. The roadmap to denuclearization and the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action" adopted during the six-party talks are still practical and relevant today.

The DPRK participates in the six-party talks with a focus on conducting bilateral negotiations with Washington. Although Pyongyang's "New York channel" is open, the "Beijing platform" remains its real mainstay. Pyongyang threatened to quit the talks more than once, but has never really done so. The significance of the six-party talks should be measured from a long-term perspective, rather than judging short-term success or failure.

The six-party talks have not died out—they are in temporary hibernation at worst. There is no chance that the DPRK will abandon Beijing to make peace with Washington alone. Any arrangement for the peninsula's future without China's involvement will not be effectively executed. The reason is that if the regional situation is not complicated enough to involve all parties, the six-party talks framework would not have been established. China is confident that its DPRK policy will not fail due to its strategic positioning on the issue.

China has been strictly carrying out sanctions and restraining measures in accord with UN Security Council resolutions, no less than other countries. Meanwhile, it has been a responsible advocate of nonproliferation against the DPRK. It is irresponsible to condemn China for not participating in sanctions against the DPRK and not accepting international obligations.

At the same time, China maintains limited assistance channels toward the DPRK and supports the country's attempts to integrate into the international system through the establishment of special economic zones. It values changes and the bettering of livelihoods in the DPRK, preventing the country from a humanitarian disaster that might be triggered by sanctions. It also tries to dissuade other countries from taking an aggressive stance that might force Pyongyang to make reckless decisions that may lead to a dead end.

Even if Pyongyang doesn't understand China's good intentions, China will not make wrong or careless decisions on issues that closely concern its strategic interests, nor will it fail to make right decisions due to outside pressure. Without the Chinese channel that sustains the DPRK's survival, there will not be relative peace or stability on the peninsula, today or in the future.

The policy on the DPRK is the backbone of China's Korean Peninsula strategy. Today's China is no longer the country it was during the Korean War in the early 1950s, when it was eager to gain a sense of security in the world. There are many more elements for China to consider, a much more solid strategic basis to stand on, and much richer strategic resources to use.

Beijing attaches equal importance to its relationships with Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang. More importantly, it wants to ensure stability and long-lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. And it will be most crucial for China to protect its geopolitical interests and unique influence in the region. China has realized a relative balance of all these goals in a complicated environment. It is unjustified to deem China's DPRK policy a failure.

If China publicly quarrels with Pyongyang, and their bilateral relationship falls apart, China will lose its unique influence on the Korean Peninsula. That would be the true failure of China's DPRK policy.

To ensure future peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, China would rather press Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul to cease inflammatory actions and join in talks rather than exerting pressure solely on the DPRK.

The author is an op-ed contributor to Beijing Review

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