The first sign that criticism of the prime minister's belligerence was getting through was the gradual muting of his government's outspoken criticism of China. Then came the symbolic turning point. In May 2008, Harper appointed David Emerson, a former Liberal with strong business connections, as foreign minister. Emerson, whose wife was born in Hong Kong, was known to be friendly toward China. He led the Canadian delegation to the Beijing Olympics and made no secret of his belief that it was essential for Canada to revive its relationship with China.

So the great change began. Harper finally made his first visit to Beijing in December 2009, and Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Canada the following year. Another factor that lent urgency to the revival of the Sino-Canadian relationship was the international financial crisis that so badly damaged Canada's traditional economic partners. With Europe and America in recession, even Harper could not afford to ignore China, one of the few bright spots in the world economy.

Expectations

So he made his second visit in just over two years and tweaked the United States in the process, something likely even he would have thought impossible a couple of years ago.

The primary focus of the trip was economic. Sino-Canadian trade has tripled in the past decade, but is weighted 4 to 1 in China's favor. The simplest way for Canada to redress that imbalance is through oil exports, so Harper's main objective was to gauge Chinese interest in the Pacific pipeline proposal. Expectations were that Beijing would be supportive, especially given the heavy Chinese investment in the Canadian energy sector over the past two years—more than $16 billion. Canada also provides a stable source of supply, unlike some of China's current oil providers located in the troubled Middle East.

Another problem for Canada is its lack of penetration of the Chinese market. In part this reflects a lingering conservatism in the Canadian business community, which remains more comfortable operating in the familiar markets of North America and Europe. But another issue is concern over the lack of transparency in the Chinese legal system: Can Chinese courts be counted on to protect proprietary industrial processes, enforce contracts, and settle disputes between Chinese and foreign parties in a non-discriminatory way?

One remedy would be a Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA). Negotiations have been going on intermittently for more than a decade, and the signing a "declaration of intent" on the FIPA was one of the most important achievements of Harper's visit.

As for the issues that were so high on Harper's agenda until the recent thaw in relations—human rights, Tibet, democratization, it is unclear how strong a line the prime minister will take. He could resort to the practice of Canada's former Liberal governments and raise Canada's concerns in private discussions with China's leaders rather than engage in vocal public criticism. Or he could leave it to lower ranking officials, such as Foreign Minister John Baird, to wield the human rights stick.

Given the strong economic focus of Harper's trip, however, it seems unlikely such disagreements will be allowed to tarnish the prime minister's late-blooming romance with China, whether the Americans like it or not.

The author is an editor at the Toronto Star and a former editor at Beijing Review

Email us at: yanwei@bjreview.com