VENTING ANGER: Supporters of the opposition participate in a demonstration against President Mikheil Saakashvili in Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, on May 26 (XINHUA/AFP)

The sovereignty issue has preoccupied the Georgian Government to the extent that it has neglected urgently needed social and economic reforms. Behind the scenes, Georgian officials believe Moscow has been secretly supporting separatist activities.

Meanwhile, a large amount of economic and military aid coupled with diplomatic assistance from the United States is an important backstop for Georgia to withstand Russia's influence. This allows Georgia to take further steps toward joining NATO.

Domestic crisis

Saakashvili is faced with a severe domestic political crisis; therefore, he expects to relieve the pressure by declaring withdrawal from the CIS.

After taking over as president through the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili has gone through some tough years. He faces three problems: intensifying separatist activities, mounting political opposition and a stagnating domestic economy.

The separation issue had been a headache for the government since the Shevardnadze years. It was frequently used as a weapon by his political opponents, including Saakashvili, with which to attack him, and finally forced his resignation.

Meanwhile, Saakashvili vowed to unify the country in his two presidential elections in 2004 and 2008. Nevertheless, the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, owing to local intransigence, remain unresolved.

Saakashvili's political opponents have exploited the separation issue at almost every turn. Very frequently they convene public demonstrations and impose pressure through the media.

In particular, following last year's conflict with Russia, Georgians voiced dissatisfaction with what they called an "unequal" armistice agreement signed by government officials—one that led to more violent attacks on Saakashvili.

In recent years, the opposition has been growing quickly in Georgia—featuring more opposition parties, stronger cohesion, and richer political capital for the opposition leaders. They have launched fierce campaigns attacking corruption and highlighting poor standards of living.

In some cases, significant action has been taken. In November 2007, for example, opposition members launched a massive protest against Saakashvili, attempting to seek his ouster by reigniting yet another "revolution."

The momentum of these rallies was underscored by the fact that notable former allies of Saakashvili—including former Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili—led the opposition activities.

Among the opposition leaders, there are some famous political figures enjoying considerable public support. Some even have foreign backing. They possess enough political bargaining power to contend against Saakashvili. Of course, the domestic economy remains another headache for Saakashvili.

The economy appears to be functioning well based on macroeconomic indexes, with an annual growth rate in the double digits. However, true living standards have improved rather slowly. This has caused widespread dissatisfaction with Tbilisi. Those who once passionately supported Saakashvili in the Rose Revolution have seen their love toward him turn to hate.

This young president now needs an event to distract his people's attention—or at least find some means to vent their anger, so as to diffuse the current political crisis.

Challenging Russia is definitely his best option. Indeed, over the years of Russian-Georgian conflicts and disputes, withdrawal from the CIS has not been the fiercest point of contention.

Let's take a look back at the past events from 2004, the first year of the Saakashvili administration. In July of that year, Georgia stopped a Russian convoy in South Ossetia and in February 2006, Georgian officials arrested three Russian military officers there.

In July 2006, Tbilisi cancelled an agreement with Russia on entering the World Trade Organization, a move that irritated Russia greatly. That September, meanwhile, Georgia detained four Russian military officers on charges of spying. Then, in August 2007, Georgian forces fired a missile at two Russian fighter jets that Georgian officials said violated their airspace.

And most memorably of course, the two countries came to the brink of an all-out war in August 2008. And in May 2009 Georgia quelled a mutiny of soldiers within its military, and accused Russia as the mastermind. Surely, these events were interwoven with accusations and revenges from Russia.

Leaning Westward

By declaring its intention to withdraw from the CIS, Georgia has shown its determination to break away from Russia and join NATO. On the one hand, it is payback for U.S. aid and support. On the other, Georgia is seeking more military and economic aid from Washington through this move.

Since the beginning of the year, the United States has strengthened military cooperation with Georgia to help Tbilisi meet NATO's military standards and accelerate the process of helping it gain membership.

Since Saakashvili took over, Western countries, led by the United States, have consistently provided military aid to Georgia—including signing military cooperation agreements, holding military exercises and providing trainings.

In 2004, Washington provided $260 million in military aid; and, in 2008 after the Russia-Georgia conflict, it offered $1 billion for Georgia's reconstruction.

A withdrawal from the CIS represents another tactic in Saakashvili's power play. This decision may offer temporary respite from the current political crisis, and win more support from Western countries. However, it will come at an economic loss for Georgia.

As a neighboring country, Russia is an important energy supplier and trade partner. In fact, a large number of Georgians work in Russia. If Russia takes retaliatory measures, it is they who will be the direct victims.

What will the future hold for Georgian-Russian relations? After the military conflict in 2008, neither country will likely resort to rash force, especially Georgia, which suffered heavily from the conflagration.

Washington has also cautioned Georgia to have "strategic patience" toward Russia from time to time. So the impact Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS has had in terms of aggravating Georgian-Russian tensions has been limited.

In the end, so long as neither side crosses the other's bottom line—for Georgia it's the independence of its restive regions; for Russia it's Georgia's joining NATO—the two countries will maintain lukewarm relations. But the specter of conflict, bilateral accusations and sanctions, however, will stay in the background.

The author is an assistant research fellow with the Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences