Territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea may stir Chinese nationalism more easily, but China's interest in the Indian Ocean is at least of equal importance, and these interests do not contradict each other.

The best approach

China has extremely important strategic interests, and also faces severe security threats, in both oceans that Asia neighbors. China has many questions to think about in terms of how to realize its ocean interests and guarantee its maritime security. Should it build a blue-water navy and establish sea supremacy in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and even the Indian Ocean? Or should it take a more indirect but more efficient and economic approach, rethinking the relationship between sea power and land power while strengthening its naval forces?

The 19th century American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that sea power is key to strong foreign policy. But his theory is not comprehensive, and sea power does not just mean absolute dominance of the oceans. It actually consists of several levels and intersects with various ocean interests. The lowest level of sea power is realizing efficient control of territorial waters. The next level is guaranteeing the safety of SLOCs. The next level after that is obtaining the navy's free movement at sea. The highest level is maritime supremacy in accordance with Mahan's theory. Both the latter levels normally require a powerful naval force. But free movement does not have to constrict other naval forces, and absolute maritime supremacy denies other navies' access to the target area and destroys them when necessary. In fact, currently no country except the United States could impose Mahan's theory of maritime supremacy in any ocean.

If measured in accordance with traditional Mahan theory, there is no doubt that China's strategic interests are opposed to those of any country that has a strong naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Sea power requires different input at different levels, which has different geopolitical consequences. China will definitely provoke conflict if it seeks maritime supremacy to the exclusion of other navies. But if China seeks free movement, the risks created can still be controlled. If China only wants to ensure the safety of its SLOCs, then there will be large space for international cooperation. Actually, considering that China's might and prosperity are based on its growing reliance on the outside world, the natural conclusion is that China would not possibly seek maritime supremacy or even free naval movement, because its foreign policy is targeted at creating a peaceful regional environment.

Therefore, China can best solve the Malacca security problem if it secures its SLOCs through regional and international cooperation, especially strategic cooperation with its all-weather friend Pakistan.

This does not mean that the same approach is suitable for territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, which is why the Chinese military has been called on to construct a blue-water navy. Besides, even if China wants to cooperate with other countries at sea, it should have enough sea power to guarantee that the direction of any cooperation follows its will.