Zhang Liangui, a professor of international strategic research at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published an article in the Beijing-based biweekly magazine World Affairs in June, analyzing the strategies of Pyongyang and Washington. He said that North Korea's nuclear declaration was not as simple as it appeared.

"It is the most crucial step to settling the entire nuclear problem," Zhang wrote.

According to U.S. requirements, North Korea's nuclear declaration must include four items: the total amount of plutonium the country has produced, the number of nuclear weapons it has created and where they are stored, the content of the country's uranium enrichment plan, and the amount of nuclear material and technology that it provides to other countries such as Syria. Last November, Pyongyang gave Washington an accounting of its plutonium production but was informed that it was not "complete and accurate."

Zhang suggested that the two sides might have formed a secret deal that called for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear facilities in exchange for its removal from the U.S. list of states that support terrorism and an end to American trade sanctions before 2008. American law stipulates that presidents must submit such decisions to Congress 45 days in advance, which meant that the Bush administration previously should have informed Congress on November 16, 2007, about removing North Korea from the list of countries that support terrorism and dropping trade sanctions. But when Bush failed to do this, North Korea abandoned its intention to implement denuclearization, Zhang said.

The experts all agree on one point: Bush is eager to resolve the issue while he is still president. This was evident on April 8 when the two countries held negotiations in Singapore and agreed on a new declaration principle.

Zhang said some people with knowledge of the situation have indicated that the nuclear declaration will be issued in two versions: a public one that will be submitted to China, covering only plutonium extraction amounts and technology; and a secret one that will be submitted to the United States, detailing North Korea's uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation activities. The United States only would verbally notify the other four parties about the second version. In exchange, the United States would agree to remove North Korea from its terrorist-state list and cancel trade sanctions.

Shi from the CIIS said the final resolution of the issue hinges on both the United States and North Korea ending their hostility toward each other and establishing mutual trust. At present, both sides are showing cooperative attitudes, which provides a good start to building mutual trust, he said.

Will the future look brighter?

At present, the parties should take a "cautiously optimistic" approach to the nuclear issue process, Shi said. If all goes well, the nuclear issue could be settled very soon on a technical level before Bush leaves office, he added.

"I have been optimistic ever since the six-party talks started several years ago, and I believe the mechanism must work," he said. "But there are still some problems that should be considered."

Shi said the standards for overseeing the denuclearization process should consist of two parts: the first is on the technical level, which should be in accordance with guidelines set by the International Atomic Energy Agency; the second is on the political level, which would meet U.S. demands.

Whether or not the United States can follow up on its two commitments to North Korea will influence Pyongyang's pace of denuclearization. Shen Dingli, a professor of international studies at Shanghai-based Fudan University, said in an article in the Oriental Morning Post that stripping off North Korea's "supporting terrorism" tag would not be easy. He said that Bush only has the right to submit the motion, while Congress must approve it. Even the Republicans believe that Bush ignored the rules