This will clearly be easier if its military forces continue to be seen as fundamentally defensive in nature, with no bases abroad. The same applies to China's relations with India. The two countries share a long border and have an equally strong interest in keeping the Indian Ocean open to the commerce necessary for both Asian giants to continue their economic development, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent visit to Beijing underscored.

Head to head?

A significant number of people profit greatly from the present U.S. defense budget. Since even people with little knowledge of military tactics realize that aircraft carriers and nuclear attack submarines are worthless for deterring ideologically driven young people from strapping improvised explosive devices to their waists, a more compelling threat must be conjured up to justify increased Pentagon spending. Since the end of the Cold War, China has become the candidate of choice among illusionist hawks.

Confrontation with China is not, however, inevitable. Perhaps the best reason for China not to seek a blue-ocean navy comes from an initially most unlikely source: The U.S. Navy. Its former head, Admiral Michael Mullen, proposed a "Thousand Ship Navy (TSN)" that would mark "a new chapter in cooperation as it emphasizes the management of shared security interests of all maritime nations." China could become a significant component of this TSN, and thus keep its shipping lanes secure at relatively little cost beyond present expenditures. Given the fact that 90 percent of all world trade and almost 70 percent of all petroleum are transported by sea, it clearly behooves both countries to cooperate closely to keep the maritime commons free of pirates, terrorists, and drug traffickers. Cooperation at sea is equally needed for missions of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Unfortunately, the highly invasive foreign policies of the United States, combined with its overwhelming military superiority, provide the Chinese with very good reasons to continue distrusting U.S. motives (including the TSN). It is therefore the responsibility of the United States to take meaningful initiatives to build support for closer cooperation with the soon-to-be world's second largest economic power. Some of those initiatives would deal directly with China, such as providing materiel and advanced training for the Chinese military to conduct search-and-rescue missions.

The United States could also foster far greater trust and cooperation specifically with the Chinese by clarifying the U.S. position toward Taiwan. Taipei should understand that should it seek "independence"and a seat at the UN, Washington will use all its diplomatic strength to insure that other nations do not recognize these claims.

The United States could also signal to China that it is willing to be a more cooperative international player. For instance, the United States could significantly reduce its nuclear stockpile and renounce the first-strike use of nuclear weapons, as China did long ago. It should also sign and ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as 155 nations have done (including China) since it was promulgated in 1982. Ending the brutal occupation of Iraq is another global measure, as would placing U.S. troops in Afghanistan under UN administration and signing a peace treaty with North Korea (55 years after the cease-fire). Holding out an olive branch to Iran, and stopping the one-sided U.S. support of the Israelis would also provide clear signals to the Chinese and the rest of the world of a major shift in U.S. foreign policy.

A reduction of U.S. threats to the world-from nuclear weapons, regional wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and potential conflicts with Iran and North Korea-would decrease the likelihood of confrontation with China as well as undercut any rationale for China's own increased military spending. Such a shift in U.S. national security strategy would not only increase the security of China and the United States but the world as well.

(The view expressed in this article does not necessarily represent those of Beijing Review.)