The second explanation is that European leaders have not settled on Bush himself, but are priming themselves for his successor. Therefore, their friendly rhetoric is paving the way for them to improve U.S.-European relations after Bush leaves office. But one problem with this view is that no one knows whether a Republican or Democrat will win the presidential election. The other problem with it is that the "pre-warming" tactic has come too early for the European countries to create its desired effect.

Why then, did Bush suddenly become attractive to the three European leaders? The reason was not based on the leadership changes themselves in France, Germany and Britain, but on changes on the Bush side. Europe hopes to use the timing of America's temporary weakness to influence its policy and concept, and the first step to this is to warm their relations with the United States.

The Iraq War has prompted the United States to adjust its foreign policy. Rumsfeld's departure marked the ebbing tide of neo-conservatism and the return of realism and rationalism in U.S. foreign policy. Relying more on international multi-lateral systems, the United States is seeking progress on various international and regional security issues. The European Union, especially France, Germany and Britain, is America's most reliable force. After the three big countries changed leaders, the Bush administration was eager to win the new leaders' support. Sarkozy's and Merkel's visits, on some levels, can be considered two of Bush's diplomatic shows.

Europe and the United States depend deeply on each other for economic reasons and have common interests and strategic goals. But although France, Germany and Britain assign themselves to the same "Western camp," their ideas on the use of military force, global management, climate and environment, and even their general views of the world are quite different.

With the enlargement of the EU, the euro and U.S. dollar have stood up to each other as equals. Europeans are spreading their ideas and actions on foreign affairs to the rest of the world, which is the root of the conflicts between Europe and the United States. Before the Iraq War, America's fame and force reached the zenith of the country's power. Conservative American political commentator Robert Kagan described this with a metaphor: Now that America is driving, Europe doesn't count on grabbing the steering wheel.

Currently, America is in a corner and urgently needs allies. The EU, and in particular, France, Germany and Britain, hopes to seize this opportunity to influence the only superpower in the world with very flexible diplomatic tactics. For instance, it awarded a Nobel Peace Prize to former U.S. Vice President Al Gore for his outstanding achievement on environment protection, which will help improve U.S. consciousness about environment protection. In another example, Sarkozy fully displayed his diplomatic artistry when he visited the United States by requiring that the country take the lead in coping with global warming. In doing so, he achieved the goal of tying America to environmental protection.

An equal relationship?

In his speech to the U.S. Congress, Sarkozy called on the United States to not be afraid of a strong EU with an independent defense policy, because NATO cannot be everywhere a conflict or crisis occurs. He also stressed that France and the United States were now allies and would be allies forever. Sarkozy's warm rhetoric showed that France hadn't given up its existing stance, but merely changed its strategy to gain practical benefits.

Currently, the U.S.-EU relationship is just as Sarkozy characterized it in May, after he won France's presidential election. He called the Americans "friends that can rely on our friendship," and said, "France will always be next to them when they need us." But, Sarkozy also added, "Friends can think differently."

Indeed, the warm rhetoric cannot cover up the truth: the United States and Europe still have many different opinions on world issues.

America's attitude is turning tough. It warned Iran that if the country could not prove it did not intend to develop nuclear weapons, it would receive a punishment worse than just sanctions. But France and Germany worried that if military action was used instead of diplomatic negotiation, the result could be just as disastrous as the Iraq War. Britain took a double standard on this issue: calling for sanctions against Iran, while offering the country 290 million pounds (about $599 million) in loans.

On the Afghanistan issue, although France and Germany said they would stand by America's side until the end of the war, the two countries do not want to send more troops to war-torn Afghanistan.

In the meantime, the United States will not change its policies on climate change, anti-missile defense bases in Eastern Europe or the weak U.S. dollar.

The author is an assistant researcher with the Institute of European Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences