Iran began to carry out research on nuclear technology in the 1950s. It was one of the first countries to set about developing nuclear technology after the United States and the Soviet Union. By the 1970s, it had put in place a research reactor, six nuclear research centers and five uranium treatment facilities under the support of the United States and other Western countries.

Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1971 and soon afterward became a shareholder in the European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium, or Eurodif, a uranium enrichment plant operator in France. In 1974, it began to build a nuclear power station in Bushehr, a coastal city on the Persian Gulf, with the help of West Germany. All this took place in pro-U.S. Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlevi during the Cold War. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran turned against the United States. Washington's policy on Iran's nuclear program has since taken a U-turn.

All the NPT signatories, except the five major nuclear powers, pledged not to develop nuclear weapons. But they have the right to use nuclear energy peacefully and are entitled to assistance from nuclear-capable countries. As a signatory to the treaty, Iran has promised not to develop nuclear weapons. For a time, it also observed the additional protocol to the NPT, which subjected itself to snap inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian authorities have always stressed that Iran's nuclear technology is solely for peaceful purposes. Given these facts, Iran has taken the legal high ground. However, the United States accuses Iran, a country that it labels as part of the "axis of evil," of taking liberty with the rules. Believing that it will be dangerous if Iran has the nuclear fuel production technology under its command, Washington has gone out of its way to prevent the country from acquiring nuclear technology.

Growing concern

Most countries do not agree with the American "axis of evil" notion and believe that Iran should have the right to peacefully use nuclear energy. But they also do not completely trust Iran on the nuclear issue for several reasons.

First, since 1984, Iran has secretly built a complete nuclear fuel production cycle, including uranium conversion, the processing of enriched uranium and a heavy-water reactor, without IAEA safeguards. It was not until 2002 when an anti-government organization in Iran uncovered the program that the Iranian Government reported it to the nuclear watchdog.

Second, Iran has refused to clarify the military nature of its nuclear program and the program's relations with its Revolutionary Guards.

Third, Iran has concealed from the IAEA that it purchased on the black market an advanced P-2 centrifuge to enrich uranium.

That's why the IAEA so far has not confirmed in its reports that Iran's nuclear program has been purely for peaceful purposes. It has demanded that Iran suspend all uranium-enrichment activities until clarifications are made.

For the IAEA and the UN, the Iranian nuclear issue is largely a technical issue. As long as Iran makes the necessary clarifications to win the trust of the international community, it will be able to enjoy the right to peacefully use nuclear energy like other NPT signatories. The United States, however, aims to change Iran's regime by using the Iranian nuclear issue as a catalyst. This divergence is the crux of the hotly contested Iranian nuclear issue.

No nuclear weapons have been used since 1945 when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, the number of countries with nuclear weapons has risen from one to eight over the past six decades. Nuclear warheads owned or deployed by the five major nuclear powers recognized by the NPT-the United States, Britain, Russia, France and China-total some 14,300. Nuclear powers not recognized by the treaty-India, Pakistan and Israel-own about 200 nuclear warheads. These ammunitions are enough to destroy the Earth more than 100 times. Today, nuclear weapons are meant to be deterrents rather than used in wars. Most countries have them as a means of safeguarding their national security and enhancing their international standing.

Double standard

The NPT, a set of rules formulated under U.S. dominance, has played a role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was predicted three decades ago that there would be 30 countries today with nuclear weapons. However, there are only eight. Despite its positive role, the treaty cannot check the proliferation of nuclear weapons at its source. A fundamental challenge is that the world is not peaceful. In particular, the independence and sovereignty of some countries are under the threat of unilateralism and preemptive policy. That's why some countries still fervently run after nuclear weapons, although they are not a panacea for safeguarding national security. The U.S. invasion of Iraq deterred Libya from pursuing its nuclear program but at the same time prompted other countries to step up their efforts to acquire nuclear technology.

Ironically, while forbidding other countries to develop nuclear weapons, the United States has quietly begun to increase its own nuclear arsenal. It has accelerated research on mini-nukes and robust nuclear earth penetrators. Its budget for the development and expansion of offensive nuclear forces was $6.8 billion in 2005, double what it was the decade before.

The United States does not demand that Israel sign the NPT and turns a blind eye to Israel's nuclear weapons. As a result, a large number of countries, especially Arab countries, refuse to sign the treaty. Some countries that have signed it secretly violate it. Others, such as North Korea, have publicly announced a withdrawal from the treaty.

With its double standard, the United States has failed to live up to the expectations of people all over the world to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. How can it expect others to take the treaty seriously? The nuclear nonproliferation regime is at risk of collapse.

(The viewpoint of the article does not necessarily represent that of Beijing Review)

The author is a former Chinese Ambassador to Iran and a guest research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies