The change is necessary given the practical needs of the Bush administration. Over the past years, it has made no remarkable progress in antiterrorism. The turmoil in Iraq led to the defeat of the Republicans in the midterm elections last November. They will be unable to defend themselves from the accusations of the Democrats on the diplomatic front in the 2008 presidential campaign unless the Bush administration makes some difference in the nuclear issue in North Korea or Iran. In this context, North Korea's initiative has paved the way for a U.S. policy change.

The point is whether the policy adjustments of the United States are strategic or not, a question that weighs heavily on the minds of North Korean leaders. From a historical point of view, the answer may be affirmative.

In addition to the concern over nuclear proliferation, the United States raised the nuclear issue at the end of the Cold War mainly out of consideration of its strategic deployment in East Asia. The pacifist and nationalist trends that emerged after the Cold War had a significant impact on the U.S.-led military alliance in East Asia. One of the important tasks of the United States at the time was to justify its military presence in East Asia. The North Korea nuclear issue was a good justification. Another reason underlying the U.S. policy toward North Korea was that Washington hoped to extend the domino effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall to East Asia, and changing North Korea's regime was a crucial part of this endeavor.

To sum up, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, changing the nature of North Korea's regime and maintaining its strategic military deployment in Northeast Asia are the three areas where U.S. strategic interests lie.

With the adoption of the joint statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in May last year, the United States and Japan initially shaped an integrated military system. U.S. strategic military deployment in post-Cold War Northeast Asia is nearing completion. The United States no longer needs to cite the North Korean nuclear issue as a justification. Moreover, the issue has been turned into an actual threat that may jeopardize the strategic military interests of the United States if it develops unchecked.

Given these two considerations, the United States needs a peaceful solution to the North Korea nuclear issue at present. A third factor that has a bearing on U.S. strategic interests is ideology. However, this factor has been subordinate to its military strategy over the past years. For example, the United States established diplomatic relations with China to check the Soviet Union. Later, it put an end to its deep-rooted hostility toward Viet Nam to balance China's influence in Southeast Asia.

According to South Korean media reports, Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. special envoy for human rights in North Korea, recently indicated that the human rights issue should be discussed before relations between the United States and North Korea are normalized. Obviously, this view is shared by a large number of U.S. politicians. At the same time, it should be noted that many others hope that the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue and the normalization of Washington-Pyongyang relations will prompt North Korea to concentrate on economic development, thereby bringing about social changes in North Korea. Also, normalizing bilateral relations and promoting the human rights dialogue between the two countries are not contradictory goals. Ideology is not expected to be a real barrier.

While it is possible and practical for the United States and North Korea to change their policies strategically, the changes will not come about easily. The historical inertia is strong. Internal factors affecting their decision-making are extremely complicated. How to get a correct perception of each other's actions and restore a basic mutual trust, which is indispensable to the success of the negotiations, remains an uphill battle.

After all, the possibility is there, something that is meaningful for both countries. A historic transition of Washington-Pyongyang relations will not be too far away if they can recognize this possibility.

(The author is a scholar at the China Institute of International Studies)