Besides the United States, other countries also have deep interests, both now and in the future, to exploit space that are vital to their comprehensive national power and their economic and scientific development and therefore their greater national security. Leaving aside the issue of using space for military purposes, these countries cannot entrust the protection of their interests in space to another country. If the security of the United States requires the absence of that same security for other countries, then the logic is inherently imbalanced, unfair and one that other countries cannot accept. The peaceful use of space should not be confused with a lack of national security interests or the deep underlying needs to protect them.

All sovereign states have an equal right to access space. As the 1967 Outer Space Treaty clearly articulates: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

Therefore, the monopolization of outer space by a single country cannot be accepted. For that reason, the U.S. administration's penchant for "exceptionalism" in space policy poses a serious threat to other countries both in terms of jeopardizing their national defense as well as obstructing their justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes.

The U.S. position makes another faulty assumption, that national space programs and space assets can be effectively dissected into commercial and civilian uses versus military uses and capabilities. This is out of tune with technological developments and military inevitabilities.

The reality is that many space technologies are inherently dual use and it is therefore very difficult to distinguish sufficiently and effectively the intentions and capabilities in space. Without some kind of mutual understanding on controlling arms in space, suspicion will dominate relations between the United States and some other countries.

The United States has rejected Russian and Chinese proposals to negotiate a treaty banning space weapons and their testing. According to official U.S. statements, such a treaty is not necessary as there is no military race in space.

In reality, the United States rejects such proposals because the treaty would constrain its freedom of action in space. In effect, this provides the United States with the opportunity to weaponize space at a time of its choosing or at a time of its perceived need. Coupled with the fact that a series of American space reports in recent years have argued vehemently for the development of military capabilities to control and dominate space, it appears that the United States aims to deploy space weapons regardless of other countries' developments and intentions in space. In this context, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others and afford it the ability to protect U.S. interests.

China's principles of deterrence in space

While China is committed to upholding international treaties and norms, it also has its own national interests and cannot subsume them to the interests of another country. China may consider the security problems of the United States, but cannot change its national security considerations at their whim. Hence, China must be prepared to avoid being at the mercy of others in space. China must seek countermeasures to deal with this problem accordingly.

How will China address these profound security concerns? Currently, China does not have a clear space deterrence theory to guide its actions for countermeasures. Still, the fundamental principles can be found by looking at the philosophy that Chinese leaders have long looked to when dealing with aggressive threats: "We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack."

To launch any effective counterattack requires by definition a powerful military capability. But what such a capability and its strategy mean specifically for space is not clear. What is clear is that China is threatened by U.S. policies in space, a reality that is compelling China to make the decision to have its own space systems capabilities.

Many Western analysts have pondered over the means China will employ to meet this threat. China's nuclear deterrence theory and its perspective on the use of nuclear weapons offer important and relevant guidelines. During the nuclear era, being under threat of nuclear attack by the superpowers, China made the strategic decision to develop its own nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong once stated, "In today's world, in order to prevent being bullied by others, we must posses these things [nuclear weapons]."

In deciding the extent of China's nuclear weapon arsenal, Mao raised three principles: "youdian" or "to have; " "shaodian" or "to have a few" and "haodian" or "of good quality." Deng Xiaoping also emphasized the deterrent factor of nuclear weapons. In other words, the Chinese approach emphasized the need for few but reliable nuclear weapons to act as a deterrent against other nuclear powers. The basic necessity to preserve stability through the development of deterrent forces as propounded by Mao and Deng remains valid in the context of space.