Actions speak louder than words. More than three years after the inception of the six-party talks, the focus of this collective mechanism aimed at resolving the Korean nuclear issue finally shifted from words to deeds, as the third phase of the fifth round of the talks ended on February 13 with another landmark document, Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement.

"If we consider the Joint Statement issued on September 19, 2005, as the conclusion of the 'promise-for-promise' or 'word-for-word' phase, the joint document adopted most recently heralds the start of the 'action-for-action' phase," wrote Tao Wenzhao, a noted research fellow at the Institute of American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), in an article published in People's Daily Overseas Edition.

While hailing the substantial commitments made by the different parties, experts reaffirmed the relevance of the six-party talks to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and bringing North Korea into the international community.

Ruan Zongze, Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies, said the joint document adopted on February 13 substantiated the September 19 Joint Statement of the fourth round of the six-party talks. He stressed that its greatest significance is that it helps restore people's confidence about resolving the Korean nuclear issue through political negotiation.

The expert noted that a lot of changes have taken place on the Korean Peninsula over the past couple of years, such as North Korea's announcement that it had nuclear weapons in February 2005 and its nuclear test in October 2006. Given the changes, many people became critical and even doubtful of the six-party talks, questioning the goal of peacefully resolving the issue, he said.

He continued that the joint document answered their doubts and showed that it is viable to seek a final solution to the Korean nuclear issue through negotiation.

Tao of the CASS singled out the concrete steps North Korea and the United States have promised to take in the joint document.

North Korea will shut down and seal within 60 days the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility, and invite back International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification. It will also provide a complete declaration of all its nuclear programs.

According to Tao, before the opening of the talks, there was speculation that North Korea would commit to freezing the Yongbyon nuclear facility. He indicated that this pledge would not be what the United States wanted, because frozen facilities can be reactivated, as North Korea did in the past.

In the joint document, however, North Korea has promised to "shut down and seal" it, a measure that Tao believes is more forceful and clear-cut than mere "freezing." Moreover, to provide a complete declaration of all its nuclear programs is also a daring decision, he noted, saying that it is tantamount to laying bare all its nuclear plans to the international community. Had it not decided to abandon its nuclear programs, North Korea would not have made this commitment, he said.

The United States, for its part, will start bilateral talks with North Korea, moving toward full diplomatic relations. It will also start the process to eventually remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and terminate the application of the Trading With the Enemy Act to North Korea.

Tao argued that these two commitments could be considered the concrete steps taken by the United States to reverse its hostile policy toward North Korea.

Initial success

Tao offered several reasons for the success of the talks. First, following North Korea's nuclear test in October last year, the UN Security Council passed a resolution denouncing the test and imposing sanctions on the country. It is clear that the international community is opposed to North Korea's bid for nuclear weapons and Pyongyang has to deal with world opinion.

Second, North Korea's security and economy deteriorated after its missile test firings last July and nuclear test in October. Conditions could continue to worsen if North Korea doesn't change course.

Third, the Bush administration has been mired in a diplomatic morass because of its controversial Iraq policy and the Iranian nuclear issue. It needs a major diplomatic breakthrough to improve its image. Progress in the Korean nuclear issue will create favorable conditions for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, too.