Pyongyang's attitude influenced its reaction to the financial sanctions imposed by Washington. It asked the United States to end the sanctions, but it did not want to accept the U.S. requirement that it make the commitment not to conduct any additional nuclear test. North Korea's attitude cut off the possibility of making substantial progress in the discussions.

The third difference was due to the change of situation of the Bush administration. The Republicans' loss in the U.S. midterm elections in November put the Bush administration in an awkward position--It has to accept more of the Democrats' views on foreign policy. On the North Korean nuclear issue, President George W. Bush can neither remain tough nor make great changes. U.S. domestic situation afforded North Korea the opportunity to carry on its Fabian strategy of a "war of attrition."

Challenges ahead

All of these changes create challenges for future six-party talks.

First, the world wonders whether or not the discussions can be resumed in a short time, because this phase of the talks did not give much hint of the next round--Pyongyang did not convince Washington of the authenticity of its word to abandon nuclear power while the latter insisted that financial sanctions and the nuclear puzzle were two different issues. Neither of them could find a proper start or a clear target. Under this backdrop, resuming negotiation not only led to boredom and but also endangered the vehicle of the six-party talks. Therefore, a lot of diplomatic effort must be made prior to the next round of discussions so as to achieve a breakthrough.

The second problem is what strategy each negotiator will use during the diplomatic efforts. To North Korea and the United States, their strategies, whether strengthening negotiation to seek solution, waiting for chances or showing a firm hand, will exert great influence to the future talks. During this phase of the discussions, the two sides took a more bilateral approach and showed enough of their bottom lines. If both sides do not take further interactive policy adjustment, the significance of such their communication is worth doubting. Besides, high-handed strategies from either side cannot work. U.S. sanctions now are close to the limit. The only strategy Washington can use will be to strengthen checks on shipping, which is very likely to cause North Korea to overreact.

Actively taking extreme actions is not a wise decision for Pyongyang, because such actions would put the country under censure, but a passive reaction to U.S. pressure would be the best excuse for North Korea to carry out its strategy. Therefore, both countries need to restrain themselves, and take a wait-and-see approach. Without efficient diplomatic mediation, the six-party talks may stagnate for a while.

The third challenge is that the nuclear issue has been prolonged. North Korea's attitude after the nuclear test makes the possibility of abandoning its nuclear program weaker. No government or its leader can freely make decisions when dealing with the nuclear issue. During this year's discussions, North Korea repeated all of its past requirements but did not give any suggestions to solve the problem. On the one hand, this showed that North Korea probably is losing its negotiating direction; on the other hand, this meant that there should be a solution that can be accepted by all six participants. Since such a solution is hard to find, the nuclear issue might be prolonged for quite a long time.

If that happens, regional security, instead of resolving the disputes between North Korea and the United States, will be the top task for Northeast Asia. In other words, Northeast Asian countries have to think about how to build regional relations with a North Korea equipped with nuclear power.

The uncertain strategic relationship among big countries in Northeast Asia has highlighted the North Korean nuclear problem. In the future, the region must figure out how to develop relations among the big countries, and establish a regional security structure, when the nuclear issue temporarily is unsettled. By this means, the six-party talks should do more than make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free.

(The author is with the China Institute of International Studies)