Valid argument

Quoting copiously from various sources, Bacevich argues his case in a convincing and matter-of-fact way. Although he focuses on issues of his own country, his approach sometimes reveals a way of thinking not uninfluenced by oriental philosophies. He uses yin and yang to describe the relationship between Dulles' CIA and LeMay's SAC, which he observes was one of competition and interdependence. The discussion about the author's own hypothetical program for Chinese military expansion abroad, which looks threatening but pales before the reality of the global military posture of the United States, could be interpreted as a veiled suggestion for Washington to think in some else's perspective. Obviously, the Boston professor fully understands the political wisdom of the famous Confucian adage, "Do not do to others what you would not have them do to you."

In Bacevich's scenario, he puts forward the following ideas:

In light of China's status as a rising power, the minister of defense of the People's Republic of China announces plans to: increase Chinese annual military spending to an amount that will exceed the combined defense budgets of Japan, South Korea, Russia, India, Germany, France and Britain; create a constellation of forward-deployed Chinese garrisons in strategically sensitive areas around the world, including Latin America; negotiate access agreements and fly-over rights with dozens of nations for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian intervention and maintaining global stability; partition the Plant Earth into sprawling territorial commands, with one four-star Chinese general assigned responsibility for the Asia-Pacific, another for Africa, a third for the Middle East,… Also included are a Chinese North America Command and a Chinese Space Command.

Bacevich adds the Chinese defense minister would certainly caution other nations not to view this program as posing any threat, assuring them that China is a vigorous, rising nation-state with a long civilization, and that she is committed to living in harmony with others. Few observers in the United States or elsewhere, Bacevich concludes, would take comfort in such assurances.

Military experience

The unique background of the author lends additional credibility to his arguments. Bacevich graduated from U.S. Military Academy at West Point and served in the U.S. armed forces for 23 years, including two years in Viet Nam. After retiring as a colonel, he devoted himself to academic research and now holds a PhD in American diplomatic history from Princeton University. Before coming to Boston University, he taught at West Point and John Hopkins University.

In the book's introduction, Bacevich calls himself a "slow learner." He recounts how, as a young man, he always took comfort in orthodoxy and subjected himself to authority. His real education did not begin until middle age when he often found reality at odds with what he had been taught to believe. He wrote this book in the hope that more people could share his experience.

But the lack of discussion from an economic and geopolitical approach may be a major weakness of the book. For the Beijing-based Xinhua Publishing House, bringing out a Chinese edition less than six months after its U.S. debut was certainly an achievement. But Chinese translations are not always faithful to the original text. It doesn't take a meticulous reader to detect errors here and there.

Nevertheless, many Chinese will read Bacevich's book with great interest. Most will join the American general public in saluting this "fierce and smart peace-monger," an epithet given him in a book review of the New York Times. Not only does he give us a concise, incisive historical review of U.S. national security policy, his insightful observations in many passages also provide food for thought. When he criticizes today's Americans for lack of interest in cultivating virtue while frantically pursuing happiness, defined often in terms of wealth and celebrity status, he actually puts a finger on an illness common in many societies, the Chinese included. Again, his discussion of Luce's conception of an American Age as the source of the Washington rules reminds us, the enthusiasm of some Chinese in talking about the "rise of China as a major power," the "Chinese model" or a "Chinese century" may not be good for the nation's health.

The author is former Editor in Chief of Beijing Review