After intensive consultations, members of the UN Security Council finally worked out a multilateral response to North Korea's recent nuclear test with the adoption of Resolution 1718 on October 14. Despite the strict economic sanctions it imposes on North Korea under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the resolution explicitly excludes the threat of military force.

North Korea challenged the universal ideal of nuclear non-proliferation enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty when it carried out an underground nuclear test on October 9, an act that it "flagrantly" conducted "in disregard of the common opposition of the international community," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement. Yet, for all its condemnation, the international community is in an embarrassing position.

A long-coveted dream

When we look back at what North Korea has done since the outbreak of the nuclear crisis, we have to admit that it is a preset goal of North Korea's leaders to make their country nuclear capable. The diplomatic efforts they have made in the past decade seemed now to have simply aimed at gaining time.

Over the years, some people have argued that North Korea is making a feint, and it does not have the real intention or ability to develop nuclear weapons. Others have insisted that North Korea's rejection of the six-party talks-a dialogue mechanism involving North Korea, Russia, South Korea, China, Japan and the United States-and its nuclear weapons ambition are due to U.S. financial sanctions. The nuclear test has proved that all these arguments are incorrect.

A nuclear weapons program is costly and time-consuming. North Korea hatched a plan to develop nuclear weapons as early as the 1950s, when it signed two nuclear technology agreements with the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, it established a nuclear research and development base in Yongbyon. Research on nuclear weapons began in the 1980s. Although North Korea signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Framework Agreement with South Korea and the United States respectively in the 1990s, the program was never completely halted. The recent nuclear test can be considered the culmination of North Korea's persistent efforts in the past decades.

North Korea aspires to have nuclear weapons for two purposes. Its ultimate goal is to transform its strategic relations with neighboring countries with its nuclear weapons capability. North Korean leaders have repeatedly underscored the need to build North Korea into "a great and prosperous power." For this small, economically backward country, developing nuclear weapons is a shortcut leading to "great power" status. Moreover, given the widening gap between North Korea and South Korea in terms of comprehensive strength, Pyongyang pursues nuclear weapons in an effort to maintain a strategic balance on the peninsula, at least psychologically.

The other goal of North Korea is to use the nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip in the negotiations. This would not only help boost its diplomatic profile but also enable it to trade temporary concessions on the nuclear issue for economic benefits. The nuclear weapons program serves domestic political needs, too.

Given these deep implications, developing nuclear weapons has long been held as an unchallengeable national policy of North Korea. It is almost certain that the recent nuclear test is only the first of North Korea's series of nuclear tests, and more tests are probably underway.

Shrewd timing

Since the development of nuclear weapons has long been on the North Korean national agenda, nuclear tests are inevitable. However, for North Korea, the timing of a test will be determined in light of the domestic and international environment.

First, North Korea chose to conduct a nuclear test recently because it had made decisive progress on its nuclear weapons program. North Korea reportedly carried out dozens of experiments before, but it had never conducted a formal test explosion. Pyongyang announced on February 10 last year that it had possessed nuclear weapons. However, foreign countries were doubtful about whether its nuclear weapons could be put to use. North Korea was not sure about this either. It needed to prove the practicability of its weapons and thus turn laboratory products into real weapons through tests.

Second, North Korea had sensed that the chances of facing military attacks would be slim if it conducted a nuclear test at this time. The United States is the most likely to initiate military attacks against North Korea. However, the country is so preoccupied with pressing issues in Iran and Iraq that it can hardly afford to launch military action against North Korea.

More importantly, the relevant countries are wrangling to reach a consensus on how to address the North Korean nuclear crisis. The United States insists on using all means possible to denuclearize North Korea. South Korea, however, holds that peace is the only acceptable option. China and Russia are opposed to excessive sanctions, still more ardently to military action.

After North Korea test-fired long-range missiles on July 5, the UN Security Council was plunged into a heated debate over the adoption of a resolution. Clearly, the big powers are more interested in guarding against each other than in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, a situation that North Korea can take advantage of. As long as they keep quarreling, North Korea will be safe in carrying out nuclear tests.

A third reason for the timing is that a nuclear test on October 9 could have a significant diplomatic impact. It had been announced that new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would visit China and South Korea in early October, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun would visit China on October 13 and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would visit East Asia in mid-October. Believing that the North Korean nuclear issue was set to be a major focus of these diplomatic activities, North Korea decided to conduct a nuclear test just ahead of them to show that it is the main player in this issue.

A makeshift resolution

Pyongyang moved from being "strategically defensive" to being "strategically offensive" when it announced that it had nuclear weapons in February last year. Its proud proclamation of the success of the recent nuclear test is even more indicative of the transition.

Before a breakthrough was made, North Korea needed time to carry out research. That was why it adopted an ambiguous attitude and maneuvered with other countries through negotiations. In this way, it gained over 10 years after the nuclear issue first surfaced in the 1990s. During that period, it proceeded with its nuclear weapons program on and off, paving the way for the announcement of nuclear capability in February 2005.

After the announcement, it became a goal of Pyongyang's foreign policy to showcase its achievements so as to force the international community to recognize it as a nuclear power. Two tendencies emerged in the international arena in the wake of the landmark announcement. Some rejected it as mere bluffing, refusing to give any response. Others took an evasive stance for fear of a drastic decision, despite their awareness of the fact that the Korean Peninsula was no longer nuclear free.

Given these factors, North Korea had decided to take further actions, such as the test firing of long-range missiles and the recent nuclear test, to render invalid all the excuses for indecision. As a result, the countries concerned had to lay their cards on the table: They could either recognize North Korea as a nuclear power and bear all the consequences of this recognition, or impose military sanctions against the country, and they had to choose from the two without any delay.

As a matter of fact, the international community does not have much room for maneuver. If it fails to take drastic measures to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula but tacitly endorses North Korea's nuclear power status, the existing non-proliferation mechanisms will collapse, heightening the risks of a nuclear war.

Given this dire prospect, it was almost inevitable that the Security Council would impose strict economic and financial sanctions on North Korea. However, opinion had diverged on whether to include military sanctions in the resolution. The new resolution would make no difference if it did not refer to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which describes the Security Council's power to authorize economic, diplomatic and military sanctions, as well as the use of military force, to resolve disputes.

Worse still, such a resolution would mean an encouragement to Pyongyang as it could imply that there would be no risks at all if it continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program. However, many countries were fearful of the near-term consequences of incorporating military sanctions into the new resolution. In this context, it was extremely difficult for the countries to formulate a wise resolution.

The international community's diplomats maneuvered. In the adopted Resolution 1718, they cited Chapter VII of the UN Charter but excluded military sanctions. The compromise is not bad, but it watered down the resolution, turning it into a transitional step. As the resolution is put into effect, the countries will find themselves back at the starting point, still faced with the difficult choice-either recognize North Korea as a nuclear power or impose military sanctions against it.

The author is a professor at the Institute of International Strategic Studies, Central Party School of the Communist Party of China