A noticeboard welcoming the arrival of giant pandas at Zoo Atlanta, outside a restaurant near the zoo in Georgia, the United States, on September 28 (XINHUA)

The meetings between President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C. in September were of interest far beyond the two countries. Decisions made by the world's two largest economies affect investments, production chains, prices, access to technology and many other issues that can impact countries not present at the talks. Therefore, one question was on everyone's mind: Would Washington and Beijing be able to find common ground, capable of sustaining cooperation beneficial to their peoples and the rest of the world?

When a dispute that initially concerned tariffs extends to technology, finance or national security, its costs spread rapidly. It is therefore hoped that competition between the two powers will remain within limits that preserve cooperation between them and, above all, strengthen multilateralism. Both countries must recognize this responsibility.

Issues on the agenda

To assess the meetings' significance in hindsight, we must distinguish between the two agendas on the table: The first included issues with greater room for negotiation; the second involved strategic interests and differing conceptions of security, military capability and international order. The distinction helps measure what an agreement can resolve and what will have to be managed over the years.

Soybeans belong mainly to the first agenda. Sales to China are important both for American producers and for U.S. domestic politics. For the Chinese Government, the product is part of a supply chain essential for vegetable oil and animal feed. Beijing may negotiate increased soybean imports from the United States, but it must consider prices and supply security. It must also take into account that such a decision would alter trade routes and the expectations of producers in other countries. Tariffs are also negotiable, although they reveal deeper disagreements. The U.S. questions Chinese industrial practices and claims to be defending its own industries. China, in turn, criticizes U.S. restrictions that hinder Chinese exports, arguing that they violate principles central to free trade.

Other issues, however, lie in a diplomatic minefield. Rare earths are one example. At first glance they appear to be a commercial issue, but they inevitably cross the line from the negotiable agenda into the structural agenda. Rare earths are used, among other applications, in the manufacture of magnets for vehicles, industrial equipment and defense technologies. China's position in processing these materials gives it influence over international supply chains, and for this reason it considers it legitimate to manage exports of resources and technologies it deems strategic.

AI was another critical issue on the bilateral agenda. Washington seeks to preserve its leadership in advanced chips and related technologies. Beijing, meanwhile, wants to develop its own capabilities and rejects the idea that its progress should permanently depend on American authorization. The good news is that Xi and Trump recognize there are shared risks. Both leaders agreed to continue dialogue and cooperation in this area. The two countries could develop protocols that prevent incidents related to AI misuse, including cyberattacks and potential biological risks. This is a useful sign, provided one recognizes the difficulty of negotiating technological security while competing for access to the means of developing it.

The Taiwan question remains a complicated topic. For China, it is a central matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Here, the realistic expectation is not a solution through commercial concessions, but careful communication capable of preventing gestures, misunderstandings or short-term calculations from triggering a crisis whose consequences would affect the entire world. There are other disagreements as well, such as those related to sanctions and international crises. China and the U.S. assess conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine differently.

The deeper obstacle

Behind every critical issue lies a deeper obstacle: Chinese and Americans adopt different methods for identifying problems, setting priorities and seeking solutions. Each method implicitly reveals different ways of viewing the world. The U.S. has developed a diplomatic culture marked by the uncompromising defense of its leadership, the negotiation of specific commitments that do not compromise its national interests and the use of pressure instruments.

China emphasizes attention to long-term trends, diplomacy oriented toward mutual gains, coordination between domestic development and foreign policy with a focus on

economic partnerships, and the search for conditions that allow differences to be managed without interrupting good diplomatic relations with partners. These descriptions do not exhaust the diversity of practices in either country. Trump brings to negotiations his personal style and sense of urgency. Xi, by contrast, operates within a political and diplomatic tradition that values stability and continuity in relations, respect for protocol, the avoidance of improvisation in diplomacy and the formulation of enduring objectives.

For a long time, habits, values and methods associated with Western powers decisively influenced the language of international diplomacy. With China, this is changing. That is why Xi's announcement during the visit—inviting 100,000 young Americans to visit China for exchange and study programs over the next five years—was very much welcomed. The initiative will not resolve disagreements over chips or Taiwan, but it will allow more Americans to directly experience a society about which opinions are often formed from afar. Understanding the other side's methods requires contact with the people and experiences that shaped them.

How can each country pursue its future without demanding that the other renounce its own? And furthermore, how can they do so without harming the dreams of other nations, especially developing countries?

The shadow of the trap

Realists are skeptical about the relevance of such questions. The shadow of the so-called Thucydides Trap leads them to give up before even trying. According to this view, the established power fears the rise of the other so much that both are ultimately driven into confrontation. The metaphor warns of a real danger, but it loses usefulness when it transforms risk into destiny. To understand Trump's attitude, we have proposed another image: the Gulliver Syndrome.

Like the giant in the story, the U.S. retains extraordinary strength, but has discovered that it cannot move without feeling the effects of the ties linking it to others. Trump may raise tariffs, restrict technologies and demand concessions. Yet each measure provokes reactions that also affect American interests. The metaphor does not diminish U.S. power. It merely reminds us that greatness and freedom of action are not the same thing. The greater a country's presence in the global economy, the greater its exposure to the consequences of its own actions. A leader who ignores these ties risks finding out too late that its strength has been eroded by the very manner of its exercise.

The Thucydides Trap asks whether a dominant power will peacefully accept losing its position to a rising rival. The Gulliver Syndrome leads us to ask whether that power knows how to act in a world where it no longer controls outcomes alone. In short, humanity's future is shaped not just by the U.S. and China, but by every country. For Trump, cooperating with China on issues of mutual interest requires recognizing limits without abandoning American interests. The problem is that the U.S. has shown difficulty in recognizing its own limits. This is precisely where the rest of the world must step in—not to tie down the giant, but to avoid being trampled by it. And for this, China is an important partner.

Common ground between China and the U.S. will be built when both achieve practical results on the negotiable agenda, recognize that the structural agenda requires a new diplomatic preparation for this new reality, and above all keep channels of dialogue open. Other countries have a direct interest in this and a legitimate expectation. After all, China and the U.S. have the right to pursue their projects of prosperity, and the rest of the world has the right to expect them to do so with the awareness that the paths to development intersect, and that cooperation between them can benefit humanity far beyond their own citizens. BR

The author is a professor of international law at the Fluminense Federal University and a recipient of the Chinese Government Friendship Award (2023)

Copyedited by Elsbeth van Paridon

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