“China-U.S. relations have climbed out of the rapid downward trajectory that began in 2018 and entered a stage of zhudi—building a floor,” said Huang Haitao, director of the Center for American Studies at Nankai University. “Rational coexistence is the only viable option. And stability does not mean an end to competition. The real test is where the floor is set.”  

In May, President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump met in Beijing and agreed on a new positioning for the relationship: a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability. Four months later, from September 23 to 25, Xi paid a state visit to the U.S. at Trump’s invitation. It was the second meeting between the two heads of state in less than half a year, an exchange of visits the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described as bearing historical milestone significance. 

The visit produced eight deliverables and shared understandings. Among them, the two sides agreed to more specifically define the goal for the nature of their relationship, taking “a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability,” agreed in May, and adding “on the basis of respect, fairness,” and as Huang predicts below, “reciprocity.” 

What would a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” actually look like in practice? With the question in mind, Beijing Review reporter Li Fangfang interviewed Huang, who is also the deputy director of Nankai University’s Zhou Enlai School of Government, ahead of Xi’s visit. Edited excerpts of their conversation follow: 

Beijing Review: How do you understand the new positioning of China-U.S. relations as a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” particularly in terms of putting it into practice? 

Huang Haitao: Strategic stability is about the long term and the big picture. It is not an ad hoc compromise or coordination over a particular issue. Rather, it is a “prescription” formulated after taking a long-term view of the entire China-U.S. relationship.  

As for the word “new,” it corresponds to an older narrative. In discussions of relations between major powers, it has been difficult to avoid the “Thucydides Trap”—a concept put forward by Harvard scholar Graham Allison in 2012 to describe a situation in which one major power seeks to displace another as the dominant power. 

But that type of relationship emerged under particular conditions of production and technology. Today, no country can completely free itself from externalities or sever its interdependence with others. The relationship between China and the United States—characterized by both mutual dependence and mutual deterrence—is historically unusual. That is where the “new” in the new type of relationship lies. 

The leaders of China and the United States have made reciprocal visits within six months. What kind of certainty do you think this will bring to the bilateral relationship? 

The fact that the two heads of state held two formal meetings within six months is itself a powerful signal. China-U.S. relations have deteriorated so rapidly in recent years that both sides have had serious concerns. That is precisely why the steering role of head-of-state diplomacy has become particularly important. 

The significance of this visit does not lie in how many agreements are ultimately signed. It lies in the fact that the visit can take place. That alone represents a vote for stability and certainty from the two countries to each other.  

It is symbolic to begin with, but those symbolic messages will ultimately translate into substantive effects in political, economic and other areas. The degree of such translation will vary, however, depending on the field. Non-sensitive areas and areas involving greater potential for conflict will develop differently. The signal itself is positive, and all sides are receiving it. The most straightforward examples are that travel advisories between the two countries may become less restrictive and uncertainty surrounding business cooperation may decline. 

China’s approach is clear: to translate the outcomes of head-of-state diplomacy into policy. The United States may not necessarily be able to do so in the same way. Anyone familiar with the U.S. political system knows that turning a policy into legislation can be an extremely difficult process. But one thing is certain: given the considerable power vested in the executive branch, particularly in such key areas as foreign affairs, defense and commerce, what the U.S. president chooses to do or not to do, and how it’s done, can make a substantive difference. 

Of course, we cannot expect the China-U.S. relationship to automatically enter a positive and constructive trajectory simply because the two leaders have met this year. That is an aspiration, not a description of reality. 

At this point, both sides have the interest, willingness and capacity to locate the floor of the relationship. So, rather than pushing for comprehensive cooperation, establishing that floor is the more pressing task at present.  

Do China and the United States have the same understanding of “stability”? 

Judging from the texts I have read, the two sides do not have exactly the same understanding of “stability.” China’s “strategic stability” amounts to what I set out earlier: a floor that both sides help build, and a long-term coexistence on top of it. The United States, meanwhile, will inevitably attach a long list of qualifications to the term—stability based on principles such as “reciprocity.” 

I think this is normal. It is unrealistic to expect two countries engaged in such intense competition to see eye to eye on every key concept. Reaching a “minimal consensus” is enough. Beyond that consensus, there is no need to scrutinize every detail. If we try to define everything too precisely, we may actually end up blocking cooperation. 

Sometimes, starting with small things and focusing on what can be done now is more effective than drawing a large circle from the outset. 

This also reflects a fundamental difference in China-U.S. negotiating styles. China tends to discuss concepts first—first defining the overall positioning of the bilateral relationship, and then moving on to the details. The United States tends to do the opposite: first negotiating individual issues in trade and economic relations, technology and people-to-people exchanges, and then saying, “Since we can reach agreement on all these issues, let’s talk about a stable relationship.” 

The two sides have different needs. But once they understand each other’s needs, there is actually considerable room for mutual understanding. 

Copyedited by G.P. Wilson  

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