In terms of the Indian troops' crossing into the Chinese territory of Donglang and their faceoff with Chinese border guards, the Indian Government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made three major mistakes:

First, India has damaged the existing consensus and border treaty at its own will. The Sikkim section of the China-India boundary was delimited in 1890 in the Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, and the boundary demarcation is recognized by both China and India. Successive Indian governments repeatedly confirmed in the past that they recognize this part of the boundary, and no disputes previously occurred. Based on this treaty, China constructed border roads within its own territory. Also based on this treaty, India built fortifications along the Sikkim section of the China-India boundary. Now, India's entrenchments and abundant blockhouses in this region have overwhelming superiority over China in terms of border defense.

Actually, India's excessive military construction activities have seriously violated the Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, signed in 1993, and the Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, signed in 1996. Thus, it is India's excessive military construction activities that have posed serious threats to China's security.

The current standoff in the Donglang area is caused by Indian troops' trespassing into the Chinese territory. It is a breach of the 1890 convention and a gross violation of international law, going against the promissory estoppel. It also completely contradicts the Modi administration's call to establish an international order "based on international rules." Even if India believes that the 1890 convention was not fair, it can't selectively accept and break the convention unilaterally. It can never claim rights years later using a map produced by Britain and trample on the 1890 treaty at its own will.

We can take a look at the map. After the 1890 convention was signed, the British were soon dissatisfied with the first clause in the treaty. While the clause states that "the boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta [River] and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu [River] and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi [currently known as Mount Ji Mu Ma Zhen]on the Bhutan frontier and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nipal [Nepal] territory," the British believed that the features of Mount Gipmochi as the starting point of the boundary were not obvious. Thus, between 1907 and 1913, Britain published a map showing the boundary starting at Batangla, 6 km north of Mount Gipmochi, believing that its features were more prominent as the dividing crest.

India's basis for trespassing into Chinese territory probably comes from this map. One of the reasons offered by the Modi administration is that India, China and Bhutan have different opinions on the boundary tri-junction. India and Bhutan hold that it is more reasonable to place the southeastern starting point of the Sikkim section of the China-India boundary at Batangla, rather than Mount Gipmochi. Thus, the Indian troops' "entry" into Donglang is legal.

However, although the border between China and Bhutan is yet to be demarcated, due to obstructions set by India, it is clear that Mount Gipmochi is located south of Donglang, and Donglang belongs to China. In the 1890 convention, the boundary tri-junction of China, India and Bhutan is Mount Gipmochi, which was put down in black and white. Although this point has no specific latitude and longitude, due to the boundary between China and Bhutan not being demarcated, a point is a point. It can never be expanded to a plane. On this issue, India is quibbling due to its concern for its own security.

Most importantly, Britain's production of the map was undoubtedly a unilateral action. The map is not a necessary part of the 1890 convention, and China has no obligation to abide by it. The Indian troops' trespass into the Chinese territory has in effect invalidated the 1890 convention and made the China-India boundary issue even more complicated. Actually, the Sikkim section, as a mutually recognized boundary section, facilitates border trade between China and India and offers a safer route for Indian pilgrims to Tibet.

However, the Donglang standoff has not only invalidated the whole China-India boundary demarcation and influenced bilateral trade and the route for Indian pilgrims to Tibet, but also granted the Chinese Government the right to renegotiate the legal status of Sikkim and its administrative division. China has the right to ask India to restore the Sikkim section of the border to the 1794 boundary decided by China's Tibet and Sikkim. Sikkim, which was known as Dremojong then, was a vassal state of Tibet, although it was independent back then.

Second, India is using the excuse of "security concern" to interfere in the domestic and foreign affairs of its neighboring countries. According to the 1890 convention, the Donglang area is part of the Chinese territory, and since then, Donglang has always been under China's effective jurisdiction. Because the Bhutanese Government objects to the southeastern end defined in the 1890 convention that defines the boundary tri-junction of the three countries, China and Bhutan have, at most, some disagreements over the Donglang area. However, not until 2000, when the 14th round of China-Bhutan border talks was held, did Bhutan make clear its understanding of the alignment of the boundary in the Donglang area. Even then, the decision seemed to be inspired by pressure from India.

This boundary issue should involve only two countries: China and Bhutan. India is not a party with a claim. However, because "Bhutan claims sovereignty over the Donglang area" and "to protect Bhutan," India illegally crossed the China-India border and entered the Chinese territory.

Moreover, in its reaction to the incident, Bhutan had no idea what India was planning to do. So India, under the guise of justice, sabotaged Bhutan's foreign affairs and forcefully undermined the efforts by China and Bhutan to resolve border disputes through diplomatic and political means.

China and Bhutan started their border negotiations in the 1980s and have held 24 rounds of talks so far. In August 2016, after the 24th round, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin declared that the two countries' border negotiations had made great progress in recent years. Despite the progress, the prospects for an agreement remain weak because Bhutan remains so close to India. As for the "Donglang dispute," China's position is very clear: China must defend its rights specified in the 1890 convention and strengthen its effective jurisdiction over the Donglang area. This position demonstrates China's respect for the treaty as well as international law. However, because Bhutan has some disagreements about the 1890 convention, China is willing to negotiate a "packaged solution" through peaceful means.

India often claims it "works closely with Bhutan to prevent damage to both nations' interests." But illegally encroaching into China's territory "for Bhutan" neither aligns with the friendly consultations conducted between China and Bhutan, nor protects Bhutan's national interests. India's move is the Modi administration taking advantage of Bhutan to protect its own interests. The event has exposed how India is manipulating Bhutan's internal and external affairs. The "friendly treaty" signed in 1949 between India and Bhutan stipulates that "Bhutan agrees to accept the guidance of the Indian Government in diplomatic relations." Not until 2007 were changes made to the imbalanced treaty, the most important of which was changing the word "guidance" into "close cooperation." But that change seems to be only superficial, and in practice, India seems to be a protective patron of Bhutan.

The 24 rounds of border negotiations over the past 33 years have led to many consensuses between China and Bhutan concerning their boundary areas. Yet, Bhutan has never formally established diplomatic relations with China because of Indian manipulation. Of the 14 nations sharing a border with China, only Bhutan lacks formal diplomatic ties with China. And Bhutan is one of only two countries with an ongoing border issue with China.

The other country is of course India. Using Bhutan as a pawn fails to capitalize on Bhutan's strategic advantages due to its geographic position directly between the world's two largest emerging economies. Bhutan could be enjoying the fruits of development, but it remains one of the least developed countries in the world.

Third, India is ignorant about the overall situation of China-India relations. Effort is required to sustain hard-earned stability in bilateral relations. Although China and India are confronted by challenges of developmental competition, clashing strategies, disputes over territorial sovereignty and problems left by history, they share enough mutual dependence in geopolitics, complementary positions in development, mutual reliance in national strategies, and cultural connections to develop a rich and mutually beneficial relationship. For the two emerging economies with huge populations and long histories, ensuring that both governments optimally benefit their peoples during development is the primary goal of bilateral cooperation.

Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed that China and India, as the two largest developing countries in the world, should properly manage and handle disagreements and sensitive issues when he met Modi in Astana, Kazakhstan, on June 9. Modi agreed and noted that the two countries should explore the potential for cooperation, strengthen communication and coordination in international affairs and respect each other's core interests and major concerns. However, the standoff in Donglang unfolded, clearly caused by the Indian Government when those words were still fresh.

New Delhi unilaterally opted to forgo "properly" handling disagreements in favor of triggering a larger dispute. The incident will leave a deep and prolonged strain on China-India relations. Considering the current development status and bilateral relations of the two countries, it will likely destabilize regional and global cooperation between China and India, considering how aggressively the Modi administration addresses disagreements. Furthermore, India will suffer a tarnished image in the eyes of Chinese people and less favorable policy by China.

New Delhi's misjudgment

India, a civilization of over five millennia, is the second most populated country in the world, following only China. Governed by a multi-party system since 1952, the politically mature country would not make such poor decisions if common sense was a guiding principle of the current government. The standoff persists and casts a dark shadow over the entire region.

The incident was created by Indian strategists, particularly Modi's policy consultants, who have shown an obsession with absolute security that has driven the Indian Government to treat perceived security threats as real, even at the cost of disturbing the domestic and foreign affairs of other countries, including Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan. The driving motive for the Modi administration to cause this standoff is Indian strategists' concern that the Siliguri Corridor, India's strategic strip, would be threatened if China builds roads to Mount Gipmochi. These analysts are intimidating themselves, however, and creating an illusory new cold war to keep themselves relevant. Such concerns hardly make sense considering India's strong military forces positioned on both sides of the corridor all the way from Donglang. It's difficult to argue that India's sabotage of its neighbor's legitimate infrastructure project in the border area in the name of "absolute security" benefits anyone.

In fact, "absolute security" far transcends borders if the concept is treated like a zero-sum game in which one country's security becomes a threat to its neighbor. It will only lead to an arms race. As the standoff in Donglang continues, China realizes that its forces on the border are far weaker than those of India, so China is looking harder at catching up with India through its ongoing military reform and modernizing its defense facilities near the boundaries to enable it to better curb India's impulses to conduct standoffs and end them before they start. India should be seeking sustainable security rather than absolute security, which can be attained only through win-win cooperation.

Why is India, especially the Modi administration, so obsessed with absolute security? Three key factors are influencing the government's actions:

First, India's strategic thinking is suffering from inertia. India considers itself a natural inheritor of the British Empire's colonial heritage. One legacy the British passed on to India's ruling elites is the Buffer Zone theory, which was developed during 200 years of colonial dominance that started with the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and ended with the British evacuation from the Indian subcontinent in 1947. According to the theory, Tibet should be the buffer zone between China and India; and the Himalayas, the natural barrier. Therefore, the Nehru administration (1947-64) strongly opposed the Chinese Central Government's peaceful liberation of Tibet. Indian elites would have preferred that Tibet kept its half-independent status forever. India signed friendship treaties with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim soon after it won independence to manipulate the security and diplomatic policies of those small states along the Himalayas. Consequently, New Delhi doesn't want to see the construction and operation of the China-Nepal Railway and the establishment of normal diplomatic ties between China and Bhutan.

In the Donglang standoff, India wants to make Donglang a small buffer zone by preventing China from constructing any frontier facilities there, so that India has absolute unilateral defense advantages for the long term. However, poor and backward Bhutan, Nepal and even the northern and northeastern parts of India are the biggest victims of the Buffer Zone theory and practices, which are supported only by India's ruling class and strategic think tanks.

Second, the situation is worsened by the Modi administration's overwhelming confidence. Since Modi took office in 2014, many achievements have been made in both the domestic and foreign affairs of India. In foreign affairs, the India-U.S. security partnership has strengthened the alliance, and the India-Japan security agreement has reached a new level. The trilateral dialogue between the United States, Japan and India has become increasingly concrete and high-reaching. The scale of the Malabar naval exercise involving all three countries has grown and could soon involve Australia too. The India-Africa Forum Summit and the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation are attracting more and more participation.

In domestic affairs, Modi launched the Goods and Services Tax, India's biggest tax reform since independence, and established the first unified market in the nation's history. Modi's strong cash ban enabled leap-frog development of domestic mobile payments. And largely thanks to Modi's whirlwind influence, his Bharatiya Janata Party won a landslide victory in the politically crucial northern state of Uttar Pradesh, further consolidating the party's dominance of India politics.

In each of the past three years of the Modi administration, India has had an impressive macroeconomic performance. Not only has its GDP growth rate surpassed that of China, but it has also become the top market for international green-field investors. Surprising successes of past aggressive policies have stimulated even bolder and more aggressively impulsive moves from the Modi administration. The Donglang standoff is one of them.

Third, the Modi administration has deepened hostility toward China. The election victories of Modi and his party ended the ruling status of the coalition government of the past 30 years and greatly enhanced the new government's decision-making capacity, which once produced huge hopes for great development between China and India.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang scheduled his first visit to India two months after he took office in 2013. The Chinese Government even broke the tradition of ensuring that the premier's South Asian trip included both India and Pakistan. And Li called Modi to congratulate him soon after Modi took office. On many occasions, Xi has proposed discussions with Modi on the possibility of aligning the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative with India's development programs, including the Monsoon Plan, Spice Route and Cotton Route.

In general, the Chinese Government's diplomatic policies toward India are intended to broaden consensus to reduce the impact of differences between the two countries on bilateral relations. However, China's good intentions are often frustrated by India's negative diplomatic responses, which are made because the Modi administration doesn't believe China and India can develop bilateral ties and conduct strategic cooperation without first settling disputes, especially on their border issues. Furthermore, they misconstrue Chinese diplomatic reactions as intending to check the rise of India. The Indian Government treats China as its archrival, and this has inspired it to embrace various security cooperation strategies offered by the United States and its allies to contain China and curb its influence.

The Modi administration's resulting hostility toward China is putting China-India relations on thin ice, and the dynamic could quickly shift from cooperative and competitive to adversarial. However, the more adversarial China-India relations become, the easier it would be for India to take extreme precautions against China. The Donglang standoff is one example.

So how the Donglang standoff is ultimately resolved will likely present a possible turning point for the Chinese Government's South Asia policy.

This is an edited version of the article published in China-India Dialogue

Copyedited by Chris Surtees

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