In an interview with China Hoy (a Spanish-language sister publication of Beijing Review) reporter An Xinzhu, Demétrio Toledo, a professor of international relations at Brazil's Federal University of ABC, explored the broader implications of the recent U.S. attack on Venezuela. Edited and translated excerpts of their conversation follow: 

China Hoy: How do you interpret the motives behind the military actions carried out by the United States against Venezuela and their impact on Latin America? 

Demétrio Toledo: In very concise terms, this represents the practical application of the Monroe Doctrine combined with what could be called the Trump Corollary, as outlined in the latest U.S. National Security Strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to intervene—even militarily—throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The context for this application of the Monroe Doctrine and the Trump Corollary is the growing importance of China in Latin America and, in Venezuela's specific case, of Russia.

One must also take into account the effects of the blockade, the attack on Venezuela, and the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, on Cuba, which will now be further weakened as it can no longer rely on Venezuelan oil [On January 4, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the U.S. plans to continue the blockade of Venezuelan oil tankers it began in mid-December 2025].

U.S. President Donald Trump has stated in interviews that the abduction of Maduro is potentially just the beginning of his actions in Latin America, indicating an increased willingness to use military force against other nations in the region.

As for Brazil, it is becoming increasingly surrounded by right-wing governments: Argentina, Chile and perhaps Venezuela.

All indications suggest that U.S. forces were assisted by a significant faction within Maduro's own government in carrying out his detention.

How would you characterize the entry of U.S. troops into a sovereign Latin American country to arrest its head of state? What similarities or differences does this action have when compared to other regional precedents, such as Panama or Grenada?

According to Trump, an aim of the military action in Venezuela is to seize Venezuela's oil reserves and oil infrastructure and transfer them to U.S. companies. This is blatant neocolonialism. Venezuelan sovereignty is being seriously threatened.

Comparing the invasions of Grenada and Panama, with the attack on Venezuela, those earlier cases did not involve the issue of oil resources, whereas in Venezuela's case oil is the central factor and was explicitly stated by Trump himself as a justification. In my view, this makes the situations fundamentally different. The action in Venezuela, in terms of its ultimate objectives, is more comparable to the first and second Iraq wars.

What is your opinion on the degree of regional hegemony exercised by the United States and what might be the future outcome of the Venezuelan crisis? 

The United States clearly seeks to assert its hegemony over the entire Western Hemisphere. This includes North America, of course, but especially Latin America.

The United States will therefore attempt to enforce its interests across Latin America by ensuring access to natural resources and by installing, or facilitating the rise of, governments aligned with U.S. interests. The United States views international relations as a zero-sum game. Therefore, if China advances its interests in any given region, U.S. strategists interpret this as a direct loss for the United States. From Washington's perspective, securing its interests in Latin America also means reducing the role and influence of China in the region.

It seems to me that one of the biggest losers, aside from Venezuela itself, is Cuba, given its dependence on Venezuelan oil resources. Brazil, which should be the main regional diplomatic actor, has remained on the sidelines and has failed to mediate the tensions between the United States and the Venezuelan Government. Likewise, China will face a far more complex diplomatic environment and will find it much more difficult to defend its interests in Latin America. BR

Copyedited by G.P. Wilson 

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