Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with U.S. President Donald Trump in Busan, the Republic of Korea, on October 30 (XINHUA) 

President Xi Jinping met U.S. President Donald Trump in the Republic of Korea on October 30, a day ahead of the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, with important agreements reached between the two presidents. Although numerous differences between China and the U.S. persist, the prevailing circumstances are more favorable than many had anticipated. 

Although uncertainties will persist, a severe deterioration of the kind seen during Trump’s first term(2017-21) appears unlikely. Despite significant disagreements in areas such as trade, manufacturing, technology and critical minerals, the overall strategic relationship between the two countries is expected to remain broadly stable.

Trump's softened policy

Trump is no longer a political novice but an experienced politician. He has removed from his administration everyone who contributed to the deterioration of China-U.S. relations during his first term. Now, aside from Marco Rubio and Peter Navarro, there are no true China hawks left in his cabinet--and even Rubio’s stance toward China has become far more moderate than before. Navarro has remained quiet in recent months, unable to influence Trump’s foreign policy thinking. In the past, Republicans were generally more aggressive and belligerent, but Trump appears to have completely changed their character. In addition, the number of officials in the State Department and National Security Council handling China and Indo-Pacific affairs has been drastically reduced, which may indicate that Trump’s primary focus is shifting toward addressing Western Hemisphere affairs rather than Indo-Pacific matters. 

Moreover, the formerly hostile stance of Trump’s public rhetoric and the official documents released by the Republican Party toward China has clearly softened. In the Republican Party’s 2024 campaign platform, there was scant mention of cracking down on China--a stark contrast to its 2016 platform, where China policy content was far more extensive. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense is expected to soon issue a new defense strategy. While the full text is not yet known, it reportedly calls for reducing--rather than increasing--U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Trump administration’s strategic priority in the coming years is to defend the homeland and expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere, rather than to confront China and Russia. In September, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth convened a major meeting, summoning senior U.S. generals from around the world back to Virginia. Rather than discussing how to contain China, they stressed that the military should play a greater role in maintaining domestic law and order. 

In the nine months since Trump returned to power, Trump has scrupulously avoided angering Beijing over Taiwan. For example, he refused to allow Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te to “transit” through the U.S. and has delayed approving arms sales to Taiwan. On the South China Sea issue, the Trump administration at this stage appears to be refraining from taking sides: It has neither egged on the Philippines to challenge China nor increased military aid or support to Manila. To date, the Trump administration still has not announced a clear Indo-Pacific strategy. Indeed, Trump has even reversed the Indo-Pacific strategy he pursued in his first term. What’s more, he has allowed U.S. relations with India to deteriorate, evidently abandoning plans to partner with India as a counterweight against China. 

Even on trade, about which Trump is deeply passionate, he has not reverted to the extreme policies of the past. Since returning to the White House, Trump has launched a trade war against virtually every country, which has hit U.S. allies in Europe and North America hard. Yet China is no longer his primary target. Over the past nine months, Trump’s trade and technology policies toward China have demonstrated relative prudence. He has moderately scaled back restrictions on semiconductor exports to China, displayed notable patience regarding the TikTok issue, and has refrained from imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese companies for purchasing Russian oil. At present, both China and the U.S. have made some moderate concessions in exchange for continued mutual benefit.

Optimistic prospects

The reasons behind Trump’s clear shift in China policy warrant closer examination. It must be emphasized that the structural contradictions between the U.S. and China remain in place, with no signs of abating. The U.S. still regards China as its sole adversary, a view unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. In other words, Trump’s change in China policy is purely tactical—a stopgap measure. 

Dramatic escalation of various conflicts within the U.S. in recent years have led to the adjustment of Trump’s policy toward China. To some extent, domestic divisions have now eclipsed its conflict with China. In the past, many believed China posed a so-called “threat” to the American way of life, but today more and more Americans have come to realize that the real danger lies within America itself--where different political parties, factions, and values regard one another as threats. 

In the coming years, Trump intends to carry out deep and thorough political reforms within the U.S., which means he will have little energy left to deal with China for the time being. He is pursuing an extensive overhaul of the federal government--targeting agencies such as the Department of Education, the Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence community and the military. These reforms will be time-consuming and will force Trump into bitter fights against his domestic opponents. A confrontation with China would only divert resources; if a conflict with China were to occur, Trump would inevitably have to rely on the U.S. intelligence apparatus and military to handle the complexities, which would in turn delay his reform agenda. That is an outcome he wants to avoid. 

Trump is a pragmatic populist. Populists tend to pander to public sentiment--whatever people want, populists will do, in order to gain support and thereby win more votes. Trump’s supporters believe that the Chinese have “stolen” American jobs, but they do not wish to confront China, much less go to war with China. Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, established an alliance system to contain China, which was indeed effective. But maintaining such an alliance was costly for the U.S., placing a heavy burden on its own people. Trump hopes to put in place a China policy that is more sustainable than Biden's. Moreover, although Trump proclaims he will establish a U.S.-led rare earth supply chain and use robots to develop rare earth mines, this goal will be very difficult to achieve in the short term. Maintaining necessary economic ties and engagement with China offers only benefits to the American people, with no real downside. 

Trump has long hoped to go down in history as a “great” president and therefore must accumulate achievements over the next three years in the eyes of the American public. In his view, antagonizing China or Russia will not truly make any gains for the U. S., nor will it make America great. By contrast, expanding U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere is a plan under which tangible successes are more attainable. He has openly declared a desire to occupy Greenland and annex Canada, and to overthrow various anti-American regimes in Latin America. While these ambitions are extremely difficult--indeed almost impossible--to realize, it is conceivable that the U.S. could secure substantial economic benefits in the Western Hemisphere and take control of a few key geopolitical footholds in the coming years. 

Cautions needed

It would be unrealistic to expect all differences between China and the U.S. to have been resolved at this summit. Over the next three years, it would not be surprising that Trump repeatedly launches frenzied accusations against China on social media. Nevertheless, his approach to China will likely operate within certain boundaries rather than being reckless. He is, in fact, a leader with a keen sense of cost and benefit--a pragmatic figure who understands how to adapt his approach according to objective conditions. 

Even if Trump himself may not intend to damage relations with China, his subordinates may be negligent in their work and may not implement his wishes. This increases the risk that some of their actions or statements could easily create complications for bilateral relations. For this reason, the two countries should establish smooth channels of communication so that officials at all levels can engage with one another effectively. This is crucial. Otherwise, should an unexpected incident occur between China and the United States, it could lead to great dangerous or even catastrophic consequences. 

It must be stressed that Trump’s temporary easing of tensions with China does not mean he has lost interest in strategic competition. On the contrary, in the view of Trump and his supporters, the United States’ top priority at the moment is to reform its domestic politics and only by resolving America’s internal problems and ills can it enhance its capacity for strategic competition with China. Trump may leave the task of confronting China to the next U.S. president. Beijing should not be lulled by this temporary thaw into lowering its guar. Rather, it must plan ahead with a long-term perspective, preparing for the far more severe challenges that lie ahead. 

The author is an associate professor at the Fudan University Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences 

Copyedited by G.P. Wilson 

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