Yasukuni Shrine. The name means a peaceful country, but for neighbors in East Asia, the shrine is a symbol of Japan's sustained military aggression throughout the early 20th century. Established in 1869 to honor those who had died in the service of the emperor, the shrine contains the names of almost 2.5 million people and, controversially, this includes 1,068 convicted war criminals from World War II (WWII), including 14 Class A war criminals.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi sent her fifth monetary offering this year on October 19 for the shrine's autumn festival, and ministers in her government attended in person. They follow dozens of ministers from Japan's conservative, nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who have visited the shrine in recent decades, including prime ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, and annual visits by Takaichi herself before she became prime minister.

Japanese Emperor Hirohito (1901-89), in whose service those enshrined fought WWII, stopped visiting the shrine because of the enshrinement of Class A war criminals in 1978, and neither of his successors have since visited either. So why, when the emperors themselves will not visit the shrine, do so many of Japan's top politicians continue to do so? The reasons are both political and historical.

The most immediate driving force behind the visits is the need to remain popular with voters. After WWII, families of fallen military personnel established associations which continue to advocate for politicians to visit the shrine. Currently, these associations have more than 8 million members, approximately 170,000 of whom are also members of the LDP, and are considered a vital source of votes.

Additionally, rebranding war criminals as heroes, promoting the righteousness of Japan's WWII war efforts and standing up to the manufactured "China threat" are all ways of appealing to right-wing voters. By attempting to provoke a response from Japan's larger neighbor, visitors to the shrine hope to show themselves as "tough on China" and unafraid to promote the right-wing historical perspective.

The popularity of visiting the "war criminal" shrine also stems from inadequate supervision of Japan's militarism by the international community since the end of WWII. This has resulted not only from negligence and complacency, but also from a shift in U.S. strategy toward Japan. The inability of the Tokyo Trial to hold accountable all those responsible for Japan's aggression and war crimes, combined with inadequate supervision of the enforcement of sentences, has allowed a militarist legacy to persist in the form of today's right-wing politicians and voters.

The most critical reason for this ineffective supervision is a shift in strategy by the U.S. Initially, the U.S. had planned to enforce demilitarization and democratic reform in Japan. However, with the onset of the Cold War, it quickly positioned Japan as an anti-Soviet "bridgehead" in East Asia, abruptly shifting its policy toward Japan from containment and transformation to comprehensive support. A large number of Japanese militarists were later reinstated to important positions after having their punishments lifted, forming the core of Japan's right-wing forces. It can be concluded that, driven by its own strategic interests, the U.S. deliberately dismantled the supervision mechanism that was supposed to impose long-term constraints on Japan.

Beyond securing votes, visiting the shrine, glorifying the military and whitewashing history are all part of a longer-term plan for remilitarization. After WWII, the Allied Forces convened war crimes trials, dismantled the Japanese Army, banned former military officers from leadership roles in the new government and enforced constitutional reform that removed Japan's right to wage wars. Many right-wing Japanese see these reforms as victor's justice and seek to reestablish Japan as a military force in the region.

With Japan holding several large-scale joint military exercises with the U.S. and attempting to sell domestically produced military frigates to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand—both in 2026, the plan is clearly well underway and no secret. The key now for Takaichi and her colleagues will be to sell remilitarization as achievable, necessary and above all, just—one shrine visit at a time.

Copyedited by G.P. Wilson 

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