Iranians take to the streets in Tehran on January 4 in a protest against Saudi Arabia's execution of Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr (XINHUA)

It was through a strange twist of fate that Adel Al-Jubeir, Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared the severing of his country's diplomatic ties with Iran on January 3. This is the same man who, being the Saudi ambassador to the United States some years ago, had been subject to a failed murder attempt allegedly by Iranian conspirators in 2011.

That anecdote helps illustrate the distrust between Riyadh and Tehran that has spanned for at least four decades. The conflict--such is the most appropriate term to describe the relationship--has degenerated through a variety of aspects and dimensions throughout generations.

When Saudi authorities executed the Shiite cleric and activist, Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr, along with three other Shiites and 43 Al-Qaeda figures on January 2, protests and condemnations erupted violently. Sheikh Nimr was considered a leader of the Saudi Shiite minority and a serious critic of the Saudi royal family. In 2012, he was injured in a clash with security forces while trying to escape and was subsequently arrested and jailed. Sentenced to death in 2014, his supporters had hoped that a deal could be reached that would secure his release.

So, when his execution was announced, Shiite Muslims in the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia as well as in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan and other places expressed intense indignation. Such a response was likely to have been expected. However, the storming of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran by an angry mob that set fire to the building was unacceptable in the eyes of the Saudi authorities. As a result, diplomatic relations were cut off immediately, and all economic activities with Iran were ceased.

The beheading of the Shiite leader, along with 43 Sunni jihadists accused of terrorism, conveyed two main messages:

First, whether Shiite or Sunni, any Saudi citizen who chooses to rebel against the government will face the same fate. This was addressed mainly to the local population. It also implies that Shiite dissension will be treated similarly to Sunni terrorism.

The second message was addressed to Iran, which is accused of fomenting trouble, pushing the Shiite minority inside the Saudi kingdom to rebellion, and opposing Saudi projects in the region. The opposition is comprised of Iran's alleged arming of Shiite militias to fight against the Saudi-backed Sunni order in Yemen, and Sunni Jihadists in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Asian and African countries. The message implies that Saudi Arabia is not impressed by Iran's aggression and is in a position to retaliate. These are the policies that embody Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's Saudi Arabian kingdom, which some commentators have dubbed as "hawkish."

Riyadh had paved the way to the mass execution, the largest since 1980, through two crucial actions: First, adopting a new defense policy; second, announcing the Islamic anti-terrorist alliance.

The new defense policy was outlined in October 2015 by Prince Sultan bin Khaled Al-Faisal while addressing the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations (NCUSAR) in Washington, D.C. The policy emphasized that Saudi Arabia's primary goals were to "defend the homeland, protect Saudi citizens, secure national interests, bolster defense of partner states and strengthen inter-agency partnerships." The prince said that "the doctrine's evolution will depend on the conventional capabilities of potential non-friendly countries, the spread of unconventional threats (Daesh, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah) and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region."

The formation of the Islamic anti-terrorist military alliance was also a major event in its own right. When he announced it on December 15, 2015, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, said that it was directed not only against the so-called Islamic State (Daesh), but also against any other terrorist organization. According to the Saudi Press Agency, 34 states have decided to form the alliance, with a joint operations center based in Riyadh. The 34 countries include most Arab League states, a number of Muslim states in Africa, and Asian countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia. More than 10 other Islamic countries, including Indonesia, are said to have expressed their support for the coalition. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Oman and Eritrea were not among the members of the alliance.

Whatever the credibility and internal cohesion of such an alliance, it is clear that neither Iran nor Iraq or Syria would join in any time soon. Yemen, Syria, and Iraq have actually joined Lebanon as a proxy battlefield between Iran and Saudi Arabia, representing Shia and Sunni communities, respectively. 

The author is an op-ed for Beijing Review

Copyedited by Bryan Michael Galvan

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